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Summary (English)
Virtually every day data breach incidents are reported in the news. Scammers,
fraudsters, hackers and malicious insiders are raking in millions with sensitive
business and personal information. Not all incidents involve cunning and as-
tute hackers. The involvement of insiders is ever increasing. Data information
leakage is a critical issue for many companies, especially nowadays where ev-
ery employee has an access to high speed internet. In the past, email was the
only gateway to send out information but with the advent of technologies like
SaaS (e.g. Dropbox) and other similar services, possible routes have become
numerous and complicated to guard for an organisation.
Data is valuable, for legitimate purposes or criminal purposes alike. An intu-
itive approach to check data leakage is to scan the network traffic for presence
of any confidential information transmitted. The existing systems use slew of
techniques like keyword matching, regular expression pattern matching, crypto-
graphic algorithms or rolling hashes to prevent data leakage. These techniques
are either trivial to evade or suffer with high false alarm rate.
In this thesis, known file content detection in network traffic using approximate
matching is presented. It performs content analysis on-the-fly. The approach is
protocol agnostic and file type independent. Compared to existing techniques,
proposed approach is straight forward and does not need comprehensive config-
uration. It is easy to deploy and maintain, as only file fingerprint is required,
instead of verbose rules.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Industrial revolution marked the onset of industrial age, similarly, digital rev-
olution of past 2 decades has marked the onset of digital age. Humans are
producing and consuming digital information at much higher rate than ever be-
fore. In the past two decades, Internet has spread with a breath taking pace
and has become an inseparable part of modern life. Internet offers world-wide
broadcasting capability, a seamless platform for information dissemination, and
a medium for collaboration and interaction between individuals irrespective of
their geopolitical location. The ease of collaboration, outreach and cost ef-
fectiveness invited organisations to use Internet for performing business. The
productivity of employees have increased manifold as a result of technology.
Email is one of the most important communication mechanism in any organ-
isation and according to an estimate, around 101 billion business emails are
exchanged per day in 2012 [20]. Enterprises are awash with ever-growing data
of all types, easily amassing terabytes of information. As per Harvard Business
Review, Walmart collects more than 2.5 petabytes of data every hour from its
customer transactions 1.
Every technology has its own dark side. Defending connected networks have
always been a challenge. Well-known examples of successful attacks against
1http://www.hbr.org/2012/big-data-the-management-revolution (last accessed 2013-
June-25).
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computer networks include Morris Worm in the 1980’s [16], to Chinese hackers
compromising US weapon systems’ designs in 2013. Administrators are facing
a challenge in keeping confidential information from leaving the networks. At
present, there is a constant increase in data breach incidents since 2009. Ac-
cording to Open Security Foundation (OSF), 1605 incidents were reported last
year, which is a steep increase of 45% compared to 2011. Some major data
breach incidents reported within last couple of years2 are [8]:
• Attackers were successful in compromising 77 million records of Sony Cor-
poration in April 2011.
• LinkedIn was allegedly hacked of 6.5 million password hashes in June 2012.
• In April 2013, more than 50 million customer’s names, emails, birth dates,
and hashed and salted passwords of LivingSocial were accessed by hackers.
Data is valuable, whether for legitimate or for criminal purposes. Ensuring the
security and privacy of the data is a major challenge. Information leakage,
including company’s intellectual property or user information, is becoming more
frequent. Unauthorized use of information can incur enormous financial cost
to an organisation. As per McAfee, malicious insiders had the largest average
number of compromised records per breach of 72,325 [24].
In order to minimize this risk, an intuitive approach is to scan the network
traffic for known files’ fragments, where known files refers to the files which are
confidential as per company’s policy and not allowed to go outside company’s
network. Traditionally, organisations added keywords like ‘confidential’ or ‘se-
cret’ to ensure that no such file having these keywords leaves the network. But
such keyword based approach is easy to evade. A more foolproof technique is
required, than just looking for a specific keyword.
1.1 Keywords
Approximate matching, similarity hashing, network sniffing, file identification,
known content detection, data leakage prevention, packet content analysis.
2http://datalossdb.org/{index/largest,statistics} (last accessed 2013-June-25).
1.2 Problem Description 3
1.2 Problem Description
One of the main aim of an attack on an organisation’s network is to obtain
confidential information, ranging from the credit card numbers of its customers
to future expansion plans of the company. Today’s network is so voluminous that
manual inspection for data leakage is impractical and an expensive alternative.
In order to address the security issues, companies install intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDS), firewalls and virus scanners. However, only two-third
of all the data breaches are the result of hacking attacks - according to OSF,
36% of all recorded incidents are involving insiders3.
Data loss prevention systems are developed to check and block outgoing traffic
for known confidential information. These systems perform deep packet analyses
and use multiple methods to detect confidential content in network traffic, for
instance, searching for keywords, patterns or regular expressions. These systems
also use cryptographic hash functions for content identification, like in digital
forensics. But such approach cannot be used in case of network traffic, as file
content is split and spread over many packets.
In this work, a new approach using approximate matching to detect known file
content in network traffic is presented. Approximate matching is a technique
for identifying similarities between some digital objects, like files, storage media,
network streams etc. It is based on the logic of identifying and picking up some
features or attributes which are unique to each object and can be used to identify
and compare them. This collection of features is the signature/fingerprint of the
object under investigation.
The working of the proposed approach is straightforward. For each network
packet sniffed, a fingerprint is generated using approximate matching algorithm.
This packet’s fingerprint is compared against a pre-computed list of fingerprints
of protected/confidential files, if packet’s content matches with content of a
protected file, data breach incident is reported. Unlike existing techniques, the
proposed technique is simple to use and does not need comprehensive configura-
tion. It can be easily deployed and maintained as only fingerprints are required,
unlike providing verbose rules.
The proposed approach can also be used for incoming traffic into a network. For
instance, an adversary can send a malicious code, which is a modification of a
previous known version, to evade IDS or virus scanners, which can be detected
by approximate matching approach.
3http://datalossdb.org/statistics (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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1.3 Motivation and Benefits
Data leakage or information leakage, can be defined as unauthorized transmis-
sion of data (or information) from within an organization to an external des-
tination or recipient [19]. As highlighted in previous section, insiders, whether
intentional or inadvertent, constitute a major source of data leakage. Instant
messages, peer-to-peer file transfer, email, cloud storage etc. are some of the
internet based vectors which are easily accessible in an organisation to cause
a data breach. Further, use of SSL or other encryption technology has made
detecting attempts of data leak practically more difficult.
The current state of practice regarding the technical ability to defend and mon-
itor Internet-based attacks is not sufficient. Attackers use sophisticated tech-
niques to evade from surveillance and it is becoming impossible to defend using
current practices. As per Bendrath [1], "the anonymity enjoyed by today’s cy-
ber attackers poses a great threat to the global information society, the progress
of information based international economy, and the advancement of global col-
laboration and cooperation in all areas of human endeavor".
There exist no detailed previous work addressing the issue of data leakage over
network. The existing data leakage prevention systems are commercial and
closed source and not much information is available about their working or
performance. The prototype developed in this thesis can be used to check data
leakage and catch the malicious insiders. Some of the scenarios where it can be
used are enumerated below [23] [8]:
Scenarios
• Illegal software downloads in a network using peer-2-peer or ftp.
• A confidential bid is leaked by an insider to a competitor through email
or cloud storage services.
• A financial services firm produces valuable research that is forwarded by
an insider to unauthorized distribution channel.
• A spreadsheet containing personal medical data of patients is posted to a
public website and the mistake goes unnoticed for a long time.
• Identifying and blocking webpages, text files or emails dealing with a spe-
cific content. For instance, since January 2011 Russia started a Internet
surveillance plan to protect kids from Internet pedophiles.
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• Detecting and deleting malware or spam before it reaches its victim and
uncover self-distributing malware.
1.4 Research Goals
Research goals of this thesis are:
1. Is it feasible to identify known file content in network packets using ap-
proximate matching?
2. Which approximate matching algorithm can be used in such a tool?
3. Develop a prototype using approximate matching algorithm.
4. Keep the network latency introduced by performing such packet inspection
as low as possible.
5. Does present approach have acceptable false alarm rate?
1.5 Methodology
Literature study - in order to find out what is the current state of the art for
data leakage detection in network traffic. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first work to identify known file content in network traffic.
Though, data leakage prevention system is the most relevant technology
to be considered.
Implementation - is carried out in two steps. First, the feasibility of the ap-
proach is established. Secondly, an effort is made to improve the perfor-
mance and detection rate by identifying the core problems and addressing
them.
1.6 Contribution
The main contribution of this work aims at establishing the feasibility whether
approximate matching algorithms can be used in detecting known file content in
network traffic. The focus is to make a working prototype which uses approx-
imate matching and signals presence of known file by reporting the filename
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detected and the source and destination IP address involved in such a transmis-
sion.
Furthermore, tests showed that approximate matching algorithm, mrsh-v2 is
best suited to use for network traffic analyses compared to sdhash. mrsh-v2 is
more efficient in terms of per packet processing time than compared to sdhash.
Also, using mrsh-v2 at application layer, i.e., lower layer headers stripped off,
gives a 100% file detection rate in single packet analysis mode, and more than
98% detection rate in case of stream based analyses mode.
1.7 Notation and Terms
This section explains all notations and terms which are used in this thesis.
• Approximate matching, a.k.a similarity hashing previously.
• sniffer refers to the prototype/tool developed during this thesis to test
the approach.
• ‘Known files’ refers to the files/content which an organisations wants to
protect, is confidential, or other way around, an organisation does not
want to enter its network (e.g. a known malware).
• DLPS refers to data leakage and prevention systems.
• IDS refers to intrusion detection systems.
• SPA refers to single packet analysis mode while analysing network traffic.
• STA refers to stream analysis mode while analysing network traffic.
1.8 Structure of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces concepts
of approximate matching, communication network’s model and network packet
inspection. These concepts are used in designing the prototype, developed for
performing network packet analysis.
Chapter 3 summarises how the implementation and testing is performed. It
discusses about the file set used for emulating known files, how the approximate
1.8 Structure of Thesis 7
matching algorithms are integrated into the prototype and eventually the over-
all proceedings to perform a test. The results thus obtained are elucidated in
chapter 4. The results chapter talks about the average true positive, false posi-
tive and false negative scores and the processing time taken to perform a match
for each packet. An improvement of initial single packet analysis approach is
proposed by using stream based analysis and discussed in the later half of the
chapter.
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the related research and development in the field
of data leakage prevention. Chapter 6 is about the discussion and analyses of
the work performed. While, the thesis is concluded by presenting a conclusion
and future work that could be performed in chapter 7.
8 Introduction
Chapter 2
Foundation
This chapter presents the foundation for the work performed in this thesis.
Section 2.1 gives an overview of hashing, while section 2.2 talks about crypto-
graphic hash functions, their characteristics and properties, and shortcomings of
cryptographic hash functions. Section 2.3 gives an introduction to the concept
of approximate matching. In the initial half of the section, evolution of ap-
proximate matching is presented, while in the later half working of sdhash and
mrsh-v2 is presented. Properties and characteristics of approximate matching
is also presented in this section.
Section 2.4 summarises the communication network models: OSI and TCP/IP
model. Network terminologies used in this work are also defined in this section.
Whereas, section 2.5 and section 2.6 discusses concepts of packet inspection and
encoding schemes respectively.
2.1 Hash Functions
A hash function, is a routine or an algorithm that maps arbitrary strings into
binary strings of fixed length. In simple words, hash functions compresses the
data, i.e, the output is shorter than the input. While a hash is a number that
is generated from some data using an hash function, in such a way that the
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distribution of the numbers look random and there is a low probability that the
same number is re-used. Hash can be interchangeably used with hash value,
hash code, hash sum or checksum.
Hash functions enable quick table lookup or data comparison tasks. Some util-
ity of hash functions are, finding items in database, detecting duplicate or sim-
ilar records in a large file, to build caches when data is stored on slow me-
dia etc. Hash functions can be broadly classified into cryptographic and non-
cryptographic hash functions based on some properties, which are discussed
in Sec. 5.2.1. Some examples of non-cryptographic hash functions are Fowler-
Noll-Vo (FNV) hash function and Java hashCode(), while cryptographic hash
functions can be exemplified by MD5(Message Digest family), SHA1, SHA2,
SHA3 (Secure Hash Algorithm family).
2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions (crypto hash) are most used for message integrity
check and digital signatures. Crypto hash are generally faster than encryption
algorithms, and therefore it is typical to compute the digital signature or in-
tegrity check of some document by applying cryptographic processing to the
document’s hash value, which is small compared to the document itself. Also,
making a digest public does not divulge any information about the content of
the original document. For instance, certain websites provide MD5 or SHA-
1 hashes of the binaries available for download along with the binaries. Such
practice ensures that the binary is authentic and is not compromised by an
attacker.
Next section enumerate the properties and requirements of a hash function to
call it a crypto hash. Note, all the crypto hash functions are hash functions but
not the other way around.
2.2.1 Requirements and Properties
For a hash function to be called as a cryptographic hash function, it should has
the following properties [31]:
Compression: Hash function h(x) should produce a fixed-length output string
s with bit-length n, for any given input string k of any arbitrary finite
length.
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Ease of Computation: Every hash-value of hash function h(x) is efficient to
compute in software and hardware.
Preimage Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find an input string
x’ (preimage) such that h(x′) = s for any given output string s for which
corresponding input string x is unknown.
Second Preimage Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find an in-
put string x′ (second preimage) for any given input string x such that
h(x′) = h(x).
Collision Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two distinct in-
put strings x and x′ such that h(x) = h(x′).
Non-correlation: Input string x and output string s are not correlated in any
way. Every bit of input string x affects every bit of output string s.
Near-collision Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two input
strings x and x′ such that h(x) and h(x′) hardly differ.
Partial-preimage Resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any
substring of input string x for any given output string s even for any
given distinct substring of input string x.
Computationally infeasible implies that solving the underlying problem is not
possible in polynomial time or constrained memory.
2.2.2 Problems with Cryptographic Hashes
Cryptographic hash functions have found a wide spread use in the industry and
a significant effort is being made to develop more secure hash functions. But
crypto hashes suffer with a few shortcomings, especially to perform known file
filtering. In [42], Roussev enumerated certain scenarios in which crypto hashes
cannot be used as filters:
1. Identification of embedded/trace evidence: A file of one format
is embedded in another file of a different format. For example, a jpg
embedded in pdf file. As per conventional approach, hash of jpg will not
be able to indicate the presence of it in pdf file.
2. Identification of code versions: Softwares are updated and patched
very frequently and thus making it infeasible to maintain crypto hash
inventory of all the files for every single version.
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3. Identification of related documents: Documents undergo transfor-
mations as they are updated. Identifying the original source of document
is not possible with crypto hashes.
4. Correlation of memory and disk sources: During a forensic investiga-
tion it is needed to be able to correlate memory captures and disk images.
The run-time layout and content of an executable/document are different
from the on-disk representation, but still have identifiable commonalities.
Due to this difference, conventional hashes will fail.
5. Correlation of network and disk sources: Files transmitted over
a network are fragmented and interleaved. Current approaches require
time-consuming packet flow reconstruction and protocol parsing to extract
transmitted files before any hash filtering can be applied.
Cryptographic hashes (ideally) depend on every bit of the input, making them
inherently fragile and unsuited for similarity detection. Above stated shortcom-
ings of conventional hash algorithms emphasise the need of an alternative family
of algorithms, which is efficient in solving above problems.
2.3 Approximate Matching
Crypto hashes (by design) can only give simple yes/no answers, e.g. two files
matched using SHA-1 will either match or not. There is a need of an algorithm
which provides a probabilistic answer - a number between 0 and 100, when two
similar files are compared. The confidence score should be low when a small
amount of content in the two files is similar and a high score when ratio of similar
content is high. Approximate matching addresses some of the issues raised in
Sec. 5.2.2.
Before delving into details of approximate matching, ways in which matching
can be performed is presented. Matching can be performed in 3 different ways
and are elaborated below [43]:
Bitwise matching uses only the sequence of bits in a digital object. The
matching is performed irrespective of any structures within the data stream.
Approximate matching algorithms come under this category.
Syntactic matching uses internal structures present in digital objects. For
example, pdf and jpg files have some standard structure and that can be
used during matching.
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Semantic matching uses contextual attributes of the digital object. This
matching is more closer to the human perception. For instance, a facial
recognition algorithms will look for facial patterns in images. The facial
recognition algorithm works agnostic to the format of the image feed it
uses.
Approximate matching or similarity hashing is a technique for identifying simi-
larities between or some digital objects, like files, storage media, network streams
etc. The underlying logic is to identify and pick some features or attributes from
each object and compare them. This collection of features is the signature of
the object under investigation. The confidence score thus generated should be
based on the number of features shared by the object.
In past few years, an effort has been made and a few such algorithms have been
proposed. ssdeep is known to be first of its kind and was accepted well by the
industry. Services like VirusTotal1 uses ssdeep to identify malwares. sdhash is
successor to ssdeep but uses totally different approach for similarity detection.
mrsh-v2 is one of the latest approximate matching algorithm proposed and
have a significant performance advantage over its peers. These algorithms and
evolution of approximate matching is discussed in upcoming sections. But firstly,
we discuss about a special data structure called Bloom filters.
2.3.1 Bloom Filters
Bloom filter is a space-efficient randomized probabilistic data-structure for rep-
resenting a set in order to support membership queries. The concept of Bloom
filters was proposed by Burton Bloom in 1970 [2]. Lets try to understand the
need of Bloom filters with an example. During a forensic analysis, the investi-
gator has a reference hash set of 50 million hashes (Hset). During the investi-
gation, investigator hashes each file he encounters and compares the generated
fingerprint against Hset to identify known content. For every query in Hset, ap-
proximately 26 main memory accesses are expected and each of which causing
a delay of tens of CPU cycles. Such a memory constrained workload severely
underutilizes the CPU, which directly slows down the investigation process.
Bloom filters provide an alternative to increase the speed of lookup operations
and reduce space requirements and in turn increasing the efficiency [40].
Bloom filters find extensive use in the field of computer networks, specifically
in network routing and traffic filtering [10] and in this section, their use in
1virustotal.com is a free online service which analyses malwares and urls, and facilitates
quick detection of malicious softwares
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Table 2.1: Bloom filter’s false positive rate variation with bits/element [40].
No. of Hashes 8 10 12 16
4 0.0240 0.0117 0.0064 0.0024
6 0.0216 0.0083 0.0036 0.0009
4 0.0255 0.0081 0.0031 0.0006
cryptographic hashing and approximate matching is discussed.
Working
The working of a bloom filter is straightforward. An empty bloom filter is a bit
array of m bits, all set to 0, used to represent a set S of n elements. A bloom
filter uses k independent hash functions h1, ..., hk with range (1,...,m). In order
to insert an element s into the filter, we compute h0(s), ..., hk−1(s) where each
h outputs a value between 0 and m − 1. Thus, each hash function sets the
corresponding bit within the Bloom filter.
To check the presence of an element s′, we compute h0(s′), ..., hk−1(s′) and check
if the bits at the corresponding positions are set to one. If all bits are set to one,
s′ is assumed to be a member of S with a high probability. If atleast one of the
bits is set to zero, it could be concluded that s′ is not member of S. The filter
will never return a false negative. However, filter can return a false positive, i.e,
it may return a ‘yes’ for a element which was never inserted [6].
After the insertion of n elements, the probability of Bloom filter returning a
false positive is a nonlinear function of the bit-per-element ratio m/n and the
number of hash functions k. The variation in false positive rate with different
parameter combination is depicted in Table 5.1 [40]. Fig. 5.1 shows an overview
of how a Bloom filter works.
Continuing with the scenario described above, instead of computing k separate
hashes for a given file, file’s cryptographic hash can be split into several non-
overlapping subhashes, and use them as if different hash functions have produced
them. A 128-bit MD5 hash can be split into four 32-bit separate hashes. This
will reduce the memory lookup from 26 to just four. Also, the false positive rate
of less than 0.3 per million doesn’t pose severe practical hindrance.
Bloom Filters also find extensive use in approximate matching algorithms to
represent hash values. Bloom filters allow fast comparison of similarity hashes
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Figure 2.1: The insertion of two elements into a Bloom filter using four hash
functions: (a)an empty Bloom filter; (b) a Bloom filter after the in-
sertion of one element, S1; and (c) a Bloom filter after the insertion
of a second element, S2. Each insertion sets four bits in the filter;
some bits might be selected by different elements, h4(S1) = h3(S3),
which can lead to false positives [40].
using the Hamming distance. sdhash and mrsh-v2 use Bloom filters for per-
forming similarity matching. They are discussed in Sec. 5.3.4 and Sec. 5.3.5
respectively.
2.3.2 Evolution of Approximate Matching
Cryptographic hashes made searching for a object, which is exact copy of refer-
ence object, easy to perform, but searching for a similar object is still a challeng-
ing task. Avalanche effect2 in cryptographic hash functions make them unfit for
2A slight change in input will alter the output significantly, e.g, half the output bits flipped.
It is a desirable property of cryptographic algorithms.
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similarity detection.
The idea of using characteristic features of one object to compare with others
to establish similarity has been there for decades. This idea can be defined as
data fingerprinting, use of more resilient features of an object to identify it. One
of the first attempt for data fingerprinting was done by Michael Rabin in 1981
[37]. His idea was based on random polynomials, and with original purpose “to
produce a very simple real-time string-matching algorithm and a procedure for
securing files against unauthorized changes” [37]. Rabin fingerprint approach is
like a checksum with low, quantifiable collision probabilities that can be used
to efficiently detect identical objects.
Udi Manber’s sif unix tool, developed in 1994, is capable of quantifying simi-
larities among text files [30]. Sergey Brin in his pre-Google years used Rabin
fingerprinting in a copy-detection scheme. Broder et al. applied Rabin finger-
printing to find syntactic similarities among web pages [11].
2.3.3 Rolling Hash
Rolling hash is a hash function where the input is hashed in a window that
moves through the input. The rolling hash functions uses a small context of a
few bytes to procduce a pseudo-random value hr. The rolling hash maintains a
state solely based on the last few bytes from the input. While processing, each
byte is added to the state and removed from the state after a set number of
other bytes have been processed. Let the input be of n characters, bi be the ith
character of the input. At any position p in the input, the state of the rolling
hash will depend only on the last s bytes of the file. Thus, the value of the
rolling hash, r, can be expressed as a function of the last few bytes as following:
rp = F (bp+1, bp, bp−1, ..., bp−s)
Rolling hash is used in Rabin Karp string search algorithm [27].
2.3.4 sdhash
sdhash was proposed by Vassil Roussev in 2010 [41]. sdhash uses a totally
different approach for similarity matching. It uses concept of similarity digest
hashing and hence getting its name (sdhash = similarity digest hash). sdhash
extracts statistically improbable features using the Shanon entropy, where a
feature is a byte sequence of 64 bytes. Each of the above selected feature is then
hashed using a cryptographic hash function SHA-1 [18]. When a Bloom filter
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is full, a new filter is added to accommodate the remaining features. Thus, a
similarity digest consists of a sequence of Bloom filters and its length is about
2-3% of input length.
Bloom filters have predictable probabilistic properties. Thus, for comparison of
two sdhash signatures a Hamming distance-based measure D(•) is calculated.
The match score gives an approximate estimate of the fraction of features that
two filters have in common. To compare two digests, for each of the filters in
the first digest, the maximum match among the filters of the second is found
[42]. The resulting matches are then averaged.
The similarity distance SD(F,G) for digests F = f1f2...fn andG = g1g2...gm, n ≤
m, is defined as:
SD(F,G) =
1
N
n∑
i=1
max D(fi, gj) where j = 1...m
sdhash computes a normalized Shannon entropy measure, as emprical proba-
bility of encountering a 64-byte feature can neither be directly estimated nor
could such observation be practically stored and looked up. These normalized
features are placed into 1000 classes of equivalence.
2.3.5 mrsh-v2
Multi-resolution similarity hashing (MRSH) [44], proposed by Roussev et al., is
a variation of ssdeep [28]. mrsh-v2 is updated version of MRSH, proposed by
Breitinger & Baier [6] and is based on the concept of multi-resolution similarity
hashing and context triggered piecewise hashing [28].
mrsh-v2 identifies trigger points in the input byte sequence to divide it into
chunks. This division into chunks uses a pseudo random function prf and a
modulus called block size b. A window of fixed size 7 slides through the whole
input, byte for byte, and prf generates a pseudo random number r at each step
over the window. If r ≡ −1 mod b, the byte sequence in the window is a trigger
point and thus the end of the chunk. The implementation aims at having a
fingerprint length of 0.5% and hence of b = 160 bytes.
Each chunk identified above is hashed using FNV [33]. The hash generated is
of 64 bit. In order to insert a FNV hash into m = 2048 bit Bloom filter, 11
bit sub-hashes are constructed based on the least significant 55 bits of the FNV
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hash. Lastly, each sub-hash sets one bit within the Bloom filter. For example,
if a sub-hash is 100101001binary = 129hex = 297decimal, then the bit 297 in the
Bloom filter is set to one.
A maximum of 160 chunks per Bloom filter are allowed in mrsh-v2 by design.
If this limit is reached a new Bloom filter is created. Hence, the final finger-
print obtained is a sequence of Bloom filters. Variable length fingerprints are
generated by mrsh-v2, unlike traditional hash functions [31].
mrsh-v2 Block Size
Block size b is the amount of chunk per Bloom filter. If the block size is small,
then it provides better coverage and higher sensitivity but requires more storage
and processing time. On the other hand, a bigger block size covers less detail
and thus is less processing intensive on comparison.
A trade-off is required to be maintained between the block size and the pro-
cessing time. In Table 5.2 gives an overview of how the hash length varies with
change in block size.
Table 2.2: Relation between block size and hash value length for mrsh-v2 [6].
Blocksize 128 160 256 320 512
Expected length in % 1.250 1.000 0.625 0.500 0.313
Comparison with sdhash
mrsh-v2 is a significant improvement over its predecessors. Computation time
for mrsh-v2 is lower than sdhash, and closest to classical hash function SHA-1.
A relative comparison of computation time is tabulated in Table 5.3.
mrsh-v2 offers better content coverage than sdhash, where coverage in case of
approximate matching means that every byte of the input influence the output
[7].
Additionaly, mrsh-v2 provides two modes for performing a comparison, frag-
ment detection mode and file similarity mode. In case of known content de-
tection in network traffic, each network packet is containing fragment of the
original file. Thus, fragment mode is ideally suited to the thesis goal.
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Table 2.3: Relative comparison of approximate matching algorithms with
SHA-1 [6].
SHA-1 mrsh-v2 sdhash 2.0 ssdeep 2.8
1.000 2.054 11.236 2.798
In the present work, we will use sdhash and mrsh-v2 for performing matching
on network traffic and establish which one of them is more suitable for real time
deployment.
2.3.6 Other Approximate Matching Algorithms
ssdeep
ssdeep was proposed by Kornblum in 2006 [28]. The tool ssdeep produces con-
text triggered piecewise hashes, commonly referred to as fuzzy hashes. Working
of ssdeep is simple:
1. Break up the file into pieces using the result of a rolling hash functions.
2. Use another hash function to a produce a (small) hash for each piece.
3. Concatenate the results to produce the hash signature for the whole file.
In [42], a comparison of ssdeep and sdhash is presented. Some of the key
comparison results are summarised in Table 5.4. In brief, ssdeep have inferior
detection rate than sdhash and also it is slower than mrsh-v2 and sdhash (see
Table 5.3). By design, ssdeep’s performance is highly dependent on the presence
of a large, continuous chunk of common data, and thus making it unfit to use
for network traffic analysis. ssdeep is not considered as a candidate algorithm
in this work.
bbhash & mvHash-B
Some other candidates which are also considered during the initial phases are:
bbhash [5] and mvHash-B [4]. But these algorithms have performance issues.
bbhash is to slow and not fit to be used in case of network packet analysis [6].
While, mvHash-B is file type dependent and thus not further considered.
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Table 2.4: ssdeep vs sdhash: True, false, and total known positives [42].
Set ssdeep sdhash Total
TP FP TP FP
pdf 39 28 45 25 46
doc 40 31 51 7 53
All 653 310 1124 71 1189
2.3.7 Properties of Approximate Matching Algorithms
Inspired from cryptographic hashes, in [6] Breitinger et al. proposed properties
for approximate matching. The properties are divided into two groups: general
and security properties. These properties provide parameters for comparing two
approximate matching algorithms. The properties are discussed below:
General Properties:
1. Compression: The output of approximate matching is much smaller than
the input. The shorter the output the better it is. Unlike conventional
hash algorithms, the output is not a fixed-length hash value. The compres-
sion is a desired quality because, firstly, a short hash value is space-saving
and secondly, the comparison of small hash values is faster.
2. Ease of Computation: Generating a hash value is ‘fast’ for all kind
of inputs. The processing time should be comparable to classical hash
functions like SHA-1. This property ensures the usability in practice.
3. Similarity Score: Comparison of approximate matching hash values is
more complex than compared to traditional hashes, which use Hamming
distance. Input of a comparison function are two hashes to be compared,
returning a score between 0 and X, where X being the maximum match
score. A maximum match score is indicative that two files are identical
or almost identical. Generally similarity score is between 0 and 100 and
represents a percentage value.
Security Properties:
1. Coverage: Every byte of an input should influence the hash value. Sta-
tistically, given a certain byte of the input, the probability that this byte
does not influence the input’s digest is insignificant.
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2. Obfuscation resistance: It should be difficult to achieve a false negative/non-
match. For example, let f be a file under investigation. It should be dif-
ficult to manipulate f to f ′ so that a comparison yield a non-match but
they are still very similar.
2.3.8 Use Cases
Approximate matching potentially have extensive use in forensic analysis by
identifying similar objects, malware or junk mail detection. In [6], use of approx-
imate matching is broadly classified into two categories: for file identification
and fragment detection. Each of the use cases are discussed below:
File Identification: In computer forensics a database of fingerprints of known
malware or files from previous investigation is maintained. During the investiga-
tion process, fingerprints of the new identified content is generated and matched
against this database to quickly identify the new content. The segregation of
hashes into known-to-be-good, known-to-be-bad and unknown input can further
simplify the forensic investigation.
Blacklisting. The main challenge for an active adversary is to conceal suspect
files from an automatic identification by investigators, anti-virus software or junk
mail scanner etc. In case of cryptographic hash functions it can be trivially done
by flipping a single bit, but it is not possible in case of approximate matching.
Whitelisting. In case of whitelisting, cryptographic hash functions are the pre-
ferred choice. For instance, an active adversary can manipulate the ssh daemon
of an operating system and include a backdoor. Thus, the original file and
the modified file are very similar although it is a malicious ssh daemon. The
whitelisting is out of scope of consideration, as no adversary will like to manip-
ulate a file to look like a suspect file.
Fragment Detection: An investigator is encounters a hard disk which is for-
matted using quick-mode. The only way to analyse the data is by analysing the
low level hdd blocks. SPH can be used in analysing these file fragments.
2.4 Communication Networks
This section describes network terminology frequently used in this work and
the framework for the specification of network’s physical components and their
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functional organization and configuration. OSI and TCP/IP are two important
reference model for network architecture discussed in Sec. 5.4.2 and Sec. 5.4.3.
TCP/IP model will be used as a reference in this thesis.
2.4.1 Network Terminologies
Some terminologies frequently used with network traffic are described below [3]:
Segment A segment is the unit of end-to-end transmission in the TCP protocol.
A segment consists of a TCP header followed by application data.
IP Datagram An IP datagram is the unit of end-to-end transmission in the IP
protocol. An IP datagram consists of an IP header followed by transport
layer data.
Packet A packet is the unit of data passed across the interface between the
internet layer and the link layer. It includes an IP header and data. A
packet may be a complete IP datagram or a fragment of an IP datagram.
Frame A frame is the unit of transmission in a link layer protocol, and consists
of a link-layer header followed by a packet.
2.4.2 OSI Reference Model
Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model [46] is a conceptual model proposed
in 1983. This model characterizes the internal functions of a communication
system by partitioning it into abstraction layers. As per the model, communi-
cation network can be divided into 7 logical layers. Each layer is a collection
of similar functions. A layer provides services to the layer above it and receives
services from the layer below it. The proposed 7 layers and their respective
functions are discussed below:
Physical Layer This layer defines the electrical and physical specifications for
devices. This layer ensures that if one side sends 1 bit, then the other side
receives 1 bit, not as a 0 bit. In a nutshell, this layer is concerned with
transmitting raw bits over a communication channel.
Data Link Layer At this layer, data packets are encoded and decoded into
bits. It accomplishes this task by having the sender break up the input
data into data frames and transmit the frames sequentially. Acknowledge-
ment frame is returned in confirmation on receiving a correct frame.
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Network Layer This layer is responsible for controlling the operation of the
subnet. Switching and routing technologies are implemented on this layer.
Transport Layer This layer provides transparency in transfer of data between
end users. Transport layer ensures the reliability of a given link through
flow control, segmentation/ de-segmentation, and error control. It is true
end-to-end layer, all the way from the source to the destination.
Session Layer The session layer allows user on different machines to establish
session between them. The operation of setting up a session between two
processes is called Binding. In some protocols this layer is merged with
the transport layer.
Presentation Layer This layer is concerned with the syntax and semantics
of the transmitted information. It ensures the independence from data
representation by translating between application and network formats.
Application Layer This layer is closest to the user. This layer directly in-
teracts with software applications that have a communicating component.
HTTP protocol is works on this layer of the network.
2.4.3 TCP/IP Model
This model was proposed by Cerf and Kahn in 1974 [13] and divides the network
into four layers. Each of these layers are discussed below in detail:
Link Layer TCP/IP model does not discuss much about the link layer. Though,
it is the lowest component layer and ensures that TCP/IP can work on
any hardware. This layer is used to move packets between two hosts on
the network.
The Internet Layer This layer is responsible for injecting the packet into any
network and sending the packet to potentially multiple networks. Internet
layer defines an official packet format and protocol called Internet Protocol
(IP). IP performs two basic functions:
• Host addressing and identification by having hierarchical IP address-
ing system.
• Secondly, packet routing.
ICMP and IGMP are some protocols that are carried over IP.
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Transport Layer This layer allows the peer entities on the source and desti-
nation hosts to perform a conversation. Major responsibility of this layer
are: end-to-end message transfer independent of the underlying network,
along with error control, segmentation, flow control, congestion control,
and application addressing. Two end-to-end transport protocols have been
defined for this layer: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User
Datagram Protocol (UDP).
Application Layer Unlike OSI model, TCP/IP model does not have a session
or presentation layer. Application layer directly interacts with the trans-
port layer to communicate over the network. All the higher level protocols
like FTP, HTTP, SMTP etc. work on this network layer.
In this thesis, TCP/IP model will be used as a reference. All the experiments
and results are reported in accordance to TCP/IP model.
2.4.4 Maximum Transmission Unit
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) is defined as the maximum size datagram
that can be transmitted through a network [35]. The MTU depends on the link
layer technology being used for the network. In case of IEEE 802.3 Ethernet,
MTU is 1500 bytes [22].
2.4.5 TCP Segmentation Oﬄoad
Large Segment Oﬄoad (LSO) technique, it is used to increase the outbound
throughput of high-bandwidth networks by oﬄoading packet processing time
from CPU to the Network Interface Card (NIC). When LSO is applied on TCP,
it is called as TCP Segmentation Oﬄoad (TSO). The working of TSO can be
explained with the help of an example. Let a unit of 65,536 bytes is to be
transmitted by the host device. Assuming MTU of 1500 bytes, this data will
be divided into 46 segments of 1448 bytes each before it is transmitted over
to network through the NIC. Process of dividing the data into segments before
sending it over the network is handed over to NIC instead of CPU. NIC will
break down the data into smaller segments, and add corresponding TCP, IP
and data link layer protocol headers. This significantly reduces the work done
by the CPU. Large Receive Oﬄoad (LRO) is a similar technique to GSO, but
applied for incoming traffic [17].
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Figure 2.2: Packet inspection depths [34].
2.5 Packet Inspection
Packet analysis is the technique of analysing the content of the network packet to
search for protocol non-compliance, viruses, spam, intrusions or, for the purpose
of collecting statistical information. One of the first approach to analyse network
packet was static packet inspection. In this approach, as the name suggests,
each packet is considered one at a time and examines each packet based on the
header information like: source IP, destination IP, source port and destination
port. Static packet inspection is very easy to deploy but also very easy to evade.
The next approach in the packet inspection evolution is stateful/dynamic packet
inspection (SPI). SPI is similar to static packet inspection but one main differ-
ence. In this, the packet filter is aware of the new and an established connection
and maintains a state of the connection.
On the basis of network layer of operation, packet inspection can be broadly
classified into three categories: Shallow, medium and deep packet inspection.
2.5.1 Shallow Packet Inspection
In shallow packet inspection, the headers of the network packet are parsed, and
the results are compared to a rule set. In this approach, a tuple of 5 elements
is maintained for each connection. The 5 elements are: Source IP address,
Destination IP address, Source transport layer address, destination transport
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layer address and service type. The rules are defined based on these fields or a
combination of them. The traffic is allowed or denied depending on whether it
adhere to the rules or not [14].
2.5.2 Medium Packet Inspection
Medium packet inspection (MPI)is done by Application Proxies (AP) or gate-
way. These AP are placed inline with network routing equipment and thus
ensuring that all the network traffic pases through these proxies. MPI allows
to parse network traffic on basis of data format types. For example, MPI can
be used to prevent client computers from receiving flash files from YouTube, or
image files from social network files [14].
2.5.3 Deep Packet Inspection
Deep packet inspection (DPI) "is a computer network surveillance technique
that uses device and technologies that inspect and take action based on the
contents of the packet, i.e. it consider the complete paylaod of packet rather
than just the packet header which includes data up to layer 7 of OSI model"
[14].
Fig. 5.2 shows the packet inspection classification with respect to the OSI model.
2.6 Encoding Schemes
Digital systems can store information only in the form of bits. A bit can only
have two values: 1 or 0. In order to convert these stored bits into something
meaningful like English alphabet, numbers and images, one requires an encoding
scheme or encoding. Encoding is a rule which gives some meaning to the data
stored using it.
Encoding is the process of transforming a sequence of characters into a special-
ized format for (efficient) transmission or storage. While decoding is inverse of
encoding and defined as the transformation of an encoded sequence back to the
original one. ASCII, Base64 or Unicode are commonly used encoding schemes.
For example, bit sequence 01100010 is letter b in ASCII encoding. A string of
1s and 0s is broken down into parts of eight bit each.
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Encoding is used in plethora of ways in network traffic. For instance, SMTP is a
text based protocol and thus sending binary data is prone to getting corrupt. To
circumvent this problem, SMTP binary payload can be encoded with a binary-
to-text encoding schemes like Base64, Base16 (hexadecimal) or Uuencoding [26].
It can be concluded that, in spite two inputs are completely identical, the un-
derlying byte structure can be different depending on the encoding scheme used
[8].
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Chapter 3
Experimental Setup
The following chapter summarises the steps to setup the development environ-
ment and to perform the tests. The first section discusses about the tools and
libraries used to create the prototype and to ensure its memory and runtime
efficiency.
Section 6.2 talks about the file set used for emulating the ‘known file’ of an
organisation. A corpus of random data files is used for establishing general
feasibility of the approach and a corpus of commonly used file types is used to
emulate real world data. The protocols and tools used for generating network
traffic containing the ‘known file’ and steps taken to ensure that it mimics the
traffic in an organisation’s network are discussed in Sec. 6.3. Sec. 6.4 describes
how the packet matching is performed for 4 TCP/IP layers.
Sec. 6.5 gives an insight on how mrsh-v2 and sdhash are integrated to perform
network traffic analyses smoothly. While, the last section summarises the overall
procedure followed to perform various tests.
As discussed in Sec. 5.3, mrsh-v2 and sdhash approximate matching algorithms
are used in the developed prototype. In further text, the term sniffer is used
to refer to the prototype/tool developed.
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3.1 Infrastructure
The development and testing is done on a machine running Fedora 17 with
Linux kernel 3.8 on Intel Core 2 Duo (3 Ghz) processor, with 4 GB RAM.
The prototype is implemented in C/C++ in order to have a good runtime
efficiency. Libpcap-1.21 is used for capturing network traffic. Libpcap provides
a system agnostic portable framework for collecting network statistics, security
monitoring and network debugging. Tcpdump, wireshark2, snort3 are some
popular open source projects using Libpcap.
3.1.1 Development Environment
The development is carried out in VIM editor, while debugging is performed
using cgdb4. cgdb is a lightweight terminal-based interface to the GNU Debug-
ger (GDB). cgdb provides a split screen view displaying the source code being
debugged, and thus used instead of GDB.
Memory Leakage
Improper handling of memory allocation in C/C++ may lead to memory leak-
age. Memory leakage can significantly effect program’s performance by reducing
the available memory to the program. In worst case, the program may be ter-
minated by the operating system. Memory leakage might go unnoticed in case
of program that run for short time, as extra memory allocated will be released
soon after the program’s termination. In the present case, the program runs for
a long duration, thus addressing memory leakage is of utmost importance. To
check and prevent memory leakage Valgrind (version 3.8.1) is used. Valgrind
is an open source tool for dynamic analysis, used for memory debugging and
memory leak detection. It is a framework comprising of various tools to perform
dynamic testing. A typical use of valgrind during the prototype development is
shown in Listing 6.1.
valgrind -v --tool=memcheck --leak-check=yes --show-reachable=yes --num-callers
=20 --track-fds=yes --track-origins=yes <executable>
Listing 3.1: Use of valgrind for detecting memory leakage.
1www.tcpdump.org (last accessed 2013-June-25).
2wireshark.org (last accessed 2013-June-25).
3snort.org (last accessed 2013-June-25).
4www.cgdb.github.io (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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Table 3.1: File size statistics for RS and TS corpus.
Corpus Total Files Avg. Size Min. Size Max. Size
Random Files 1000 410.12 KB 4.00 KB 14 MB
TS Corpus 3282 487.06 KB 4.00 KB 17 MB
Execution Time Profiling
In order to analyse the execution time of the constituent parts of a program,
gprof is used; available through operating system’s package manager yum. The
programs source code is compiled with -pg option of gcc. A profile file, gmon.out
is created which is used to calculate the amount of time spent in each routine.
gprof gives run-time figures based on a sampling process, so it is subject to
statistical inaccuracy. Inspite of this limitation, it gives a good approximate
idea about the program’s execution times. Linux’s time command provides the
execution time of the overall script/program and cannot be used to determine
the execution time of comprising routines of a program.
3.2 File Set
This section elaborates on the corpus used for emulating ‘known file’ of an
organisation and how it is generated.
Two data sets are developed, one comprising of random data (RS) and other of
real world data (TS). RS is used for establishing the feasibility of the approach,
while TS is used to emulate real world scenario.
Random data is generated using Linux’s /dev/urandom/ together with dd com-
mand (Listing 6.2). RS consists of 1000 files with random data.
dd if=/dev/urandom of=./dev_random/file bs=1024 count=file_size
Listing 3.2: Linux’s command to generate random files.
TS is developed by modifying t5 corpus5. t5 corpus is widely used within digital
forensics and includes commonly used file types, like pdf, doc, jpg etc. t5 does
not contain executables, thus 400 executables from a machine running Windows
5http://roussev.net/t5/t5-corpus.zip (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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are included. Also, html files in t5 corpus are omitted, as html files are not
used for transferring confidential information and they are similar to text files.
Results for text files will hold true for html files as well. A general overview of
the file sizes in the corpus is highlighted in Table 6.1.
In case of real world data, it is ensured that the corpus does not contain similar
files. Similar files are detected using all-against-all-comparison of mrsh-v2. Two
files having match score > 0 are called similar and either of the file is removed
from the corpus. The corpus obtained after removing similar files is called test
corpus (TS) and its constitution is shown in Table 6.2.
Table 3.2: Statistics of t5-corpus and test-set TS.
jpg gif doc xls ppt pdf txt exe html
t5 362 69 533 250 368 1073 711 0 1073
TS 358 69 333 212 282 954 674 400 0
3.3 Network Traffic Generation
Network traffic is generated by transmitting RS and TS corpus using various
application layer protocols. During the testing phase, three widely used appli-
cation layer protocols are used: HTTP, FTP, and SMTP. However, the whole
approach of using approximate matching for known file detection is protocol
agnostic.
The network traffic is generated locally and is available for local use only. The
traffic is accessed over the loopback network interface. The outside access to the
generated traffic is blocked by making suitable changes to the respective con-
figuration files and adding rules to the local firewall. The tools and commands
used for generating network traffic for various protocols is discussed in detail
below.
HTTP: httpd package provided with Fedora distribution is used for setting up a
local HTTP server. Underlying httpd is Apache HTTP Server. systemctl is used
for starting and controlling the state of httpd service. To generate network traf-
fic, each file in the corpus is copied to the http server’s directory (/var/www/html
in Fedora) and accessed one at a time using Linux’s curl command.
FTP: FTP traffic is generated by setting up a local FTP server using vsftpd
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package provided by yum package manager. The traffic is generated by making a
request for each corpus file using Linux’s curl command. Note, FTP can operate
in two modes: binary mode and ASCII mode [21]. The tests are performed using
the binary mode.
SMTP: SMTP traffic is generated using mpack package provided by yum pack-
age manager. mpack encodes the attachments in Base64 encoding. To generate
traffic, an email is sent to a local email address (on the same machine) with a
corpus file as an attachment to it. sendmail command can send emails only
in ASCII (text) format, which is not considered to be a best practice to send
binary files and thus not used for generating and testing SMTP network traffic.
Oﬄine Network Packets
Performing each test by sending same corpus each time is a time intensive pro-
cess. A typical test for generating match scores for mrsh-v2 with TS takes more
than 16 hours. For each test, the sniffer is started, followed by a sleep time
of 3 seconds, to ensure the fingerprint list is read and ready to be used by the
sniffer. Also, a sleep time of 5 seconds is maintained after generating network
traffic to avoid mixing of traffic between analysis of two files.
In order to bring down the testing time for a single test, network packets are
taken oﬄine and written to the filesystem. sdhash and mrsh-v2 are fast in
performing file-against-file comparison. Running test against oﬄine network
packets reduces testing time for a single test by half. The testing times are
still higher than expected, as ext4 filesystem performance decreases when a
directory contains a large number of files. In this case, a directory contains
more than 290,000 network packets. Though, a slight improvement is achieved
by arranging the packets in sub-directories, and it takes 7.5 hours to perform a
test.
MTU & TSO
In this work, all the traffic for testing is generated on the loopback (lo) network
interface of the device. By default, MTU (see Sec. 5.4.4) for lo is 65,535 bytes.
The MTU is reseted to 1500 bytes using ifconfig lo mtu 1500 command, to
ensure that test environment emulates the real scenario.
Since, TSO (see Sec. 5.4.5) is used at end user machine only and approximate
matching approach is applicable for the routers and other network devices as
well, TSO is disabled for the experimentation. On a Linux host TSO can be
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disabled using ethtool -K tso off command.
3.4 Layer Specific Packet Matching
Packet matching can be performed for any of the 4 TCP/IP network layers
(Sec. 5.4.3). The additional header included in the network packet for a given
payload might effect the detection rate negatively. In theory, the detection rate
for the packet stripped off all the layer specific header, which is effectively file
fragment only, should give the highest possible match score. But detecting each
header’s length and hence stripping it off is a time consuming process. Therefore,
a trade-off has to be made between the match score and processing time.
During the testing, the header for each layer is stripped off individually and
then matching is performed. If the link layer and IP header are stripped to
perform the match, it is called matching at TCP layer. For the remainder of this
thesis, matching is said to be performed at a certain layer if all the headers are
stripped off. For application layer matching, all lower layer headers are stripped
off. Hence, only application layer header and the payload is considered.
For a given network packet, score and processing time for each layer is generated.
Analysing these statistics, the network layer which shows the best behaviour is
decided and is used.
3.5 Integrating mrsh-v2 & sdhash into sniffer
The prototype uses approximate matching tools, mrsh-v2 and sdhash. One
of the method for integrating mrsh-v2 and sdhash is by calling the respective
executables from the sniffer directly. Any change to the internal source code
in the future version of the tools won’t effect the working of the prototype, until
the user interface is changed. But accessing the executable from a program is
a slow process and will introduce unwanted latency in the network traffic. An
alternative to this is to import the source code to the prototype and make the
respective method calls from the program itself. Since, the source code for both
the tools is open source and easily available, approach to import the source code
into the prototype is pursued. Integrating and calling respective algorithms from
the sniffer is simple and described in the following sections.
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3.5.1 sdhash
sdhash-2.3 is used in the present implementation of the sniffer. sdhash can be
integrated by using the library libsdbf.a generated on compiling and installing
sdhash on a system. In sdhash source code, sdbf class represents a hash of file,
while sdbf_set is a vector comprising of list of sdbf objects. A sdbf object is
created for all the ‘known files’ against which the comparison of a network packet
is to be carried out, which all together constitutes a sdbf_set (known_sdbf_set).
A new sdbf object is created for each network packet by passing the pointer
to the network packet to the sdbf constructor. This sdbf constructor generates
a sdhash fingerprint for the network packet. sdhash implementation exposes
a method for matching two sdhash sets against each other. Thus, each net-
work packet’s sdbf object is added to a singleton sdbf_set (packet_sdbf_set).
packet_sdbf_set and known_sdbf_set are compared against each other to ob-
tain the result. The sdhash returns match score as a string, which is parsed
in the sniffer to perform further actions depending on the match score. A
typical implementation of sdhash in the sniffer is shown in Listing 6.3.
/*creating new sdbf object for incoming network packet */
sdbf *sdbf_obj = new sdbf(packet_name, packet, SDHASH_BLOCK_SIZE, packet_length);
sdbf_set *sdbf_query = new sdbf_set();
/*singleton set for the network packet’s sdbf object */
sdbf_query-> add(sdbf_obj);
/* comparing known files set with above created network packet’s sdbf set.*/
result_string = set_known_files->comapare_to(sdbf_query, SCORE_THRESHOLD,
SHDASH_SAMPLE_SIZE);
Listing 3.3: Code snippet for importing sdhash into sniffer.
3.5.2 mrsh-v2
For integrating mrsh-v2, source code is need to be imported and integrated
for making respective function calls to perform packet matching. mrsh-v2 de-
fines a struct FINGERPRINT, which contains mrsh-v2 fingerprint for a file.
The approach with mrsh-v2 is similar to sdhash. FINGERPRINT_LIST is a
list of FINGERPRINT. FINGERPRINT is created for each ’known file’ and
put together in a single FINGERPRINT_LIST. When a network packet is
received, FINGERPRINT is created for that packet. mrsh-v2 exposes fin-
gerprint_against_all_comparison() method to perform comparison of a single
36 Experimental Setup
FINGERPRINT against a FINGERPRINT_LIST. A typical usage of mrsh-v2
usage in sniffer is shown in Listing 6.4.
/*create FINGERPRINT for the incoming network traffic*/
FINGERPRINT *fp_pkt = init_empty_fingerprint();
/*hash the packet to generate the correspoding fingerprint */
hashPacketBuffer(fp_pkt,packet, lenght_packet);
/*compare known file’s list with the network packet */
fingerprint_against_list_comparison(known_file_list, fp_packet);
Listing 3.4: Code snippet for importing mrsh-v2 into sniffer.
mrsh-v2 returns a MATCH_LIST struct as a result of comparison performed,
which is parsed by the sniffer to perform further operations depending on
match score.
3.6 Per Packet Processing Time
Processing time per packet is the time taken to generate the fingerprint of the
network packet and compare it against the ‘known files’ fingerprints. To per-
form match at layers other then link layer, the lower layer headers have to be
stripped off, which also consumes some processing time and included in the
final processing time for each packet. Time for stripping the header is also in-
cluded in the processing time. In a nutshell, the time taken since the network
packet is received by the sniffer and the corresponding result are reported for
the packet, constitutes per packet processing time. From here on, per packet
processing time will be referred as processing time, if otherwise specified.
Processing time is computed using C++ clock() function in time.h header file.
clock() returns the processor time consumed by the program, also called CPU
time. The value returned is expressed in clock ticks, which are units of time of
a constant but system-specific length. To calculate the actual processing time
of a program, the value returned by clock is compared to the value returned by
a previous call to the same function.
3.7 Proceeding
This section discusses the working of the prototype in detail. The steps to start a
typical test are highlighted, including fingerprint list generation, network traffic
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generation, packet matching and its analysis. The proceeding is straight forward
and the steps involved are discussed in upcoming sections.
3.7.1 Fingerprint Set Generation
A fingerprint set is a list/database containing fingerprints of ‘known files’ gen-
erated by approximate matching algorithm. Two separate fingerprint set are
created for each algorithm. A Shell script is used to automate the processes
of generating fingerprint sets. Each file from the corpus (RS or TS) is hashed
using mrsh-v2 and sdhash and the hash is added to the respective fingerprint
set.
Listing 6.5 shows the commands used to generate fingerprint for a file using
mrsh-v2 and sdhash.
mrsh-v2: mrsh -p <directory> >> fingerprint.mrsh
sdhash: sdhash <filename> >> fingerprint.sdbf
Listing 3.5: mrsh-v2 & sdhash commands to generate hash for a file.
All the fingerprints with mrsh-v2 are generated with blocksize of 80 (see Sec. 5.3.5),
as in a test scenario with 1000 random files, only 172,167 network packets are
detected with blocksize of 160, while 180,509 packets are detected with blocksize
of 80.
Encoded Traffic
In case for encoded traffic, a separate fingerprint set is to be created. During
the testing, Base64 encoding is used. For creating the fingerprint set, each file
is converted into Base64 format and this Base64 string is hashed using mrsh-v2
and sdhash. It is observed that packets having Base64 encoded data have an
additional newline character at each 72nd position. In order to increase the
detection rate of Base64 encoded files, newline character at every 72nd is also
added while creating fingerprint set for encoded traffic. The files are encoded
to Base64 scheme using Python scripts.
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3.7.2 Network Traffic Generation
As discussed in Sec. 6.3, network traffic is generated by starting protocol specific
system daemon. The file is accessed by making protocol specific requests. In
case of HTTP and FTP, requests are made using Linux’s curl command. SMTP
traffic is generated by using mpack command. The length of the content in the
email body is 30 character for all tests. The commands used for generating the
respective traffic are shown in Listing 6.6.
HTTP: curl ‘http://localhost/<file>’ > /tmp
FTP: curl -u <username:password> ‘ftp://localhost/<file_path>’ -o ‘/tmp’
SMTP: mpack -s <subject> -c <content type> <file> <email>
mpack -s "Matching" -c application/pdf 000010.pdf admin@localhost.localdomain
Listing 3.6: Commands to access HTTP, FTP and SMTP traffic.
To calculate true positive, false positive and false negative scores, the sniffer
is executed for one file at a time and all the corresponding packets’ statistics
are written to a file. By doing so, it is ensured that network traffic of two files
is not mixed.
3.7.3 Sniffing & Analysing Network Traffic
sniffer is responsible for sniffing network traffic, hashing the packets using
either mrsh-v2 or sdhash and comparing these network packets against the
set of fingerprints of ‘known files’. Main settings and parameters required by
sniffer are:
-a: Set algorithm mr=mrsh-v2 or sd=sdhash
-l: Input file containing list of hashed files
-o: Redirect the matching score output to a file
-O: read from offline packet dump
-w: write packets to file for offline use
-s: Get statistics of the session
-f: Filter in pcap format to filter sniffer packets.
-d: Network Interface to sniff packets from.
-t: threshold matching score
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sniffer on startup, reads the input file containing the list of fingerprints of
‘known files’, created in Sec. 6.7.1, and loads the hashes into the RAM. When a
network packet arrives, its fingerprint is created using the approximate matching
algorithm specified during the startup. This generated fingerprint is compared
against the hashes of ‘known files’. If the match score is more than the specified
threshold score, then the file detected is reported.
In order to keep the latency introduced by sniffer to minimum, the number
of processed packets can be reduced by filtering the network traffic. sniffer
supports pcap filter format6 for filtering network traffic. While testing protocol
specific packets like TCP’s SYN, FIN and ACK packets, HTTP’s GET requests
are filtered out. Also, these small packets are unlikely to contain file payload.
All the match scores reported by the tool are redirected to a file. After comple-
tion of transmitting all the files in the corpus, the file containing the statistics
is evaluated. Evaluation of such a file is discussed in the next section.
3.7.4 Result Compilation
The statistics file generated in the previous section is evaluated using Python
scripts. A typical output of sniffer for a single packet looks like:
[*] Packet number:1
[*] Total packet:/corpus/t5/000109.jpg | whole_packet | 095
[*] IP Packet:/corpus/t5/000109.jpg | ip_packet | 097
[*] TCP Packet:/corpus/t5/000109.jpg | tcp_packet | 097
[*] Payload Packet:/corpus/t5/000109.jpg | payload_packet | 100
[*] Total Time: 0.030
The scripts reads output for each packet for all the files tested, and maintains
score on per file basis as well as globally (all files together). The scripts calculates
many parameters, some of the important one are: total number of packets
encountered, match scores for all four network layers for each packet, processing
time for each packet and average scores. The output of the analysis looks like:
THRESHOLD: 25
Total Files:3276
Total Files detected: 3276
6www.manpagez.com/man/7/pcap-filter (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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Packets above threshold count 260230
total packet count: 290314
true positive packet count: 260111
false positive packet count: 41577
false true both count: 41458
false negative packet count: 30084
average true positive score: 95
average false positive score: 58
highest true positive score: 100
lowest true positive score: 26
highest false positive score: 100
lowest false positive score: 26
true positive percentage: 89.59
false positive percentage: 14.32
unique false positive percentage: 0.04
false negative percentage: 10.36
The parameters calculated above are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Experimental Results
This chapter discusses the results obtained after performing various tests to
establish the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed approach. Initially, the
terminology used in the rest of the chapter is described. Section 4.2 talks about
the results obtained on using random data for emulating ‘known files’. In this
section, feasibility of approximate matching based approach is established and
also motivates which network layer and approximate matching algorithm to use.
Section 4.3 discusses about the results obtained while emulating real world sce-
nario by using TS corpus. Section 4.4 and section 4.5 discusses the feasibility
of detecting encoded traffic and embedded information using present approach
respectively. While, in the last section stream based analysis approach is pre-
sented.
4.1 Terminology Used
Following terminology is used to describe the results obtained during the various
tests [8].
True Positive (TP) is when a packet of a given file is detected correctly, i.e,
42 Experimental Results
approximate matching algorithm detects the file which is actually there in
the packet.
False Positive (FP) is when approximate matching algorithm reports pres-
ence of another file in a packet of a given file. In simple words, false
detection of a file in a packet.
False Negative (FN) is when approximate matching algorithm does not de-
tect any file in a packet, though the packet is known to be of a file from
the database.
Threshold (t) is the score to classify a match as true positive or false positive.
As we only consider scores equal to or greater 25: 25 ≤ t ≤ 100.
True positive rate (TPR) is the amount of network packets that yield a
score ≥ t when comparing it against the original file digest.
False positive rate (FPR) is the amount of network packets yielding a score
≥ t but the packet match does not belong to the file. Note, that a false
positive can have 1 or more matches. For instance, a rate 4% means that
4% of the packets received 1 or more matches with false files.
False positive only rate (FPoR) is the amount of network packets which
have only false positives and no true positive.
False negative rate (FNR): is the amount of network packets yielding a
score < t but the packet actually belongs to a file.
4.2 Detection Rate with Random Data
In a first step, the packet analysis is performed using random data traffic, in
order to establish the feasibility of the whole approach. Preparation and char-
acteristics of random data corpus is discussed in Sec. 6.2. These random files
are used to emulate the network traffic generated on transferring ‘known files’.
The network packet analysis is performed using both mrsh-v2 and sdhash on
all 4 TCP/IP network layers.
4.2.1 Detection Rate for Each Network Layer
A total of 189,509 packets are generated for 1000 random files transferred over
the network while performing the test. Results are computed for all 4 network
layers using both mrsh-v2 and sdhash for each layer. The results obtained are
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summarised in Table 7.1 for mrsh-v2 and in Table 7.2 for sdhash. It can be
clearly observed that, the average match scores increases on moving higher in
the network protocol stack. The maximum average score is obtained when the
matching is performed at the application layer. Secondly, the average scores are
higher for mrsh-v2 than compared to sdhash.
A small modification is made to mrsh-v2 algorithm, the first and last bloom
filter created for a packet are ignored while performing a match. By doing so,
the application layer header does not influence the matching score. This slight
modification increased the average scores.
The FNR is low for both the algorithms. The reason for packets going unde-
tected, counted as false negatives, is the low entropy of the content in network
packets. mrsh-v2 and sdhash detects unique features for performing match
based on entropy in the content being analysed. If the entropy is low, the num-
ber of unique features detected will be less and while performing a match, a low
score or no score is possible. An example of a file having low entropy content is
documented in appendix C.
Table 4.1: Statistics for 4 network layers for mrsh-v2.
Layer Avg. TP Score Avg. FP Score TPR FPR FNR
Ethernet 91 29 98.64 3.55 1.34
IP 91 29 98.60 3.59 1.35
TCP 92 29 98.60 3.79 1.39
Payload 95 29 98.48 4.28 1.51
Table 4.2: Statistics for 4 network layers for sdhash.
Layer Avg. TP Score Avg. FP Score TPR FPR FNR
Ethernet 83 55 96.94 6.45 1.30
IP 87 57 97.15 6.60 1.08
TCP 88 57 97.18 6.72 1.02
Payload 89 60 97.09 5.85 2.12
True positive and false positive score distribution for mrsh-v2 is presented in
Fig. 7.1 and for sdhash in Fig. 7.2. In case of mrsh-v2, around 80% of the
packets having a true positive match give a score between 95-100 (78.83% have
score=100), while for sdhash the true positive packets are distributed over the
score >75 (without modification, mrsh-v2 have similar distribution like sdhash).
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Figure 4.1: Score distribution for random traffic using mrsh-v2.
All the above discussion corresponds to detection of content in a single packet. It
needs to be highlighted that all the files transferred during the experimentation,
all of them are detected successfully. Where, a file is said to be detected, if at
least one packet gives a match for that file.
4.2.2 Processing Time
The processing time (see Sec. 6.6) using mrsh-v2 and sdhash is presented in
Table 7.3. Processing time for link and application layers are only presented in
the table, to keep it less verbose.
The data for both the algorithms is in agreement with the theory, that the pro-
cessing time should increase as one moves up the network layers for performing
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Figure 4.2: Score distribution for random traffic using sdhash.
a match. Though, the difference in processing time on two extreme layers (link
and application) is very small. Also, it can be observed from the table that the
processing time for mrsh-v2 is about 5 times faster than sdhash, which is also
the conclusion of [9].
The processing time is directly proportional to the number of fingerprints in
the dataset to compare against. The larger the number of fingerprints, more
processing time the matching will take. It is more elaborated in the next chapter.
4.2.3 Algorithm and Network Layer to Perform Matching
Latency refers to the delay incurred while processing the network data. In this
case, latency is the difference between the time when the data has arrived, and
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Table 4.3: Avg. processing time (in milliseconds) for mrsh-v2 and sdhash.
Layer Link Payload
mrsh-v2 0.62 0.63
sdhash 3.33 3.36
to the moment it is available to the user. One of the main goals of the work is
to keep the latency as minimum as possible.
In the previous section, it was concluded that processing time for mrsh-v2 is
faster than sdhash. Also, the average scores for mrsh-v2 are higher than com-
pared to sdhash. Considering the better performance of mrsh-v2 over sdhash,
mrsh-v2 is used for performing further tests.
Also, the processing time for application layer is higher than the other lower
layers, but the average scores are higher for the application layer. As a trade-off
between the detection rate and processing time, it is decided to use application
layer for packet matching. Also, at the application layer, the headers of other
layers do not influence the match score and content anlaysis in true sense can
be carried out.
Thus, the further results presented are with using mrsh-v2 on the application
layer. Also, in this section, research goals 1 and 2 are achieved.
4.3 Detection Rate with Real World Data
In the previous section, feasibility of the approach was established using random
data. Also, it was decided to use mrsh-v2 on application layer for performing
packet matching. In this section, the testing is carried using the real world data
(TS corpus) to emulate ‘known file’ network traffic.
A total of 290,314 packets are generated for 3282 files. A TPR of 86.69%, FPR
of 14.32%, and FNR of 10.31% is obtained. A score distribution histogram
is presented in Fig. 7.3. It is in agreement with the results obtained using
random data. The frequency of true positives is dominated towards the right
of the histogram. Also, the percentage of packets having true positive score in
between 95-100 is also very high.
The FPR with real world data is higher than that with the random data. It is
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so, because of the existence of ‘common subsequence’. For example, common
headers of jpg files, or common headers of pdf files. Hexdump of a typical packet
having header of a jpg is documented in appendix A. Such packets have more
than one false positive match. Since, a jpg image can be present in a doc, a pdf
or a ppt file, cross matching between file types is also observed.
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Figure 4.3: Score distribution for TS corpus traffic using mrsh-v2 on applica-
tion layer.
To identify the number of packets having false positive but no true positive, as
‘common subsequence’ give true positive as well, FPoR is used. FPoR gives an
approximate idea of false positives caused without presence of ‘common subse-
quence’. FPoR for present test scenario is 0.04%.
It is important to highlight that, as in case with random data, all files trans-
mitted in this test scenarios are also successfully detected.
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Table 4.4: Statistics of various file types in TS.
File Type TPR FPR FPoR FNR
jpg 96.92 11.85 0.02 3.05
gif 97.79 10.54 0.00 2.20
doc 74.11 14.96 0.09 25.80
xls 81.61 18.56 0.02 18.36
ppt 92.07 14.34 0.02 7.90
pdf 95.25 12.40 0.04 4.69
txt 87.63 14.80 0.08 12.35
exe 84.85 18.59 0.07 15.07
total 86.69 14.32 0.04 10.31
4.3.1 Results for Different File Types
As stated in previous section, all the files transmitted are detected successfully.
In this section, detection rates for the various file types in TS are presented in
order to identify which file types are best detected.
Though all the files are detected, but statistics for all the file types in the TS
corpus are also calculated and compiled in Table 7.4, in order to identify which
file types are easy to detect over the others. Pdf, jpg, gif have data in binary
format and good TPR for them indicates that approximate matching approach
is better than the existing ones. Existing approach are only good for detecting
text data, this is discussed further in Chapter 8. Score distribution histograms
for various file types are documented in appendix B.
4.3.2 Processing Time
In case of TS corpus, the number of fingerprints to compare against has in-
creased to 3282. As per the expectation, the processing time is increased to
2.32 milliseconds.
4.3.3 Threshold Score
Till now the packets giving match score > 25 are only considered. From Fig. 7.3,
it can be observed that for score > 85 the percentage of packets having false
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Table 4.5: Statistics for Base64 encoded traffic.
Layer TPR FPR FPoR FNR
Payload 99.97 0.004 0.0002 0
positive is less than the percentage of packets having true positive. By increasing
the match score’s lower limit, the chances of encountering a true positive will be
higher than a false positive. Also, the number of packets to process will reduce
significantly and in turn helping to decrease the processing time. Section 7.6
talks about using stream based analysis in order to detect files and it uses the
idea of higher threshold score just discussed.
4.4 Detection Rate for Encoded Traffic
Section 5.6 discusses the need for encoding network traffic. In an organisation
there are plethora of applications used. Certain applications require to encode
the data to work efficiently or are designed to use a specific encoding scheme.
One such example is SMTP protocol. When the data is encoded, approximate
matching approach is ineffective in detecting the ‘known files’. In this section,
a work around for such a scenario is proposed.
The naive approach is to identify the encoding used in the network traffic in real
time and then decode the data and perform the match to identify known content.
But this approach will be slow and processing intensive. To circumvent this
problem, following approach is used and tested with SMTP protocol. A file is
attached to the email and the attached file is encoded using Base64 scheme. The
‘known files’ are encoded using Base64 scheme and fingerprints are generated
for each encoded file. The detection rate observed is shown in Table 7.5. The
test comprised of only 500 files, randomly chosen from TS. All the 500 files are
successfully detected using this approach.
In an organisation, it is trivial for an administrator to identify encoding scheme
used by an application. The encoding specific fingerprint set can be created for
the ‘known files’ and that can be used to detect data leakage by sniffing the
application specific traffic.
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4.5 Detection of Embedded Information
Approximate matching based approach can also be used for detecting embedded
objects as well. An embedded file is a file that is hidden or store in another
file. For example, a jpg file in a pdf or a video in a ppt. If the underlying
byte structure of the embedded content is not significantly altered, i.e. the bit
stream of the included content is unaltered, then it can be easily detected using
the present approximate matching based approach.
To verify such a scenario, pdf and doc files are created by embedding a jpg file
in each. These modified files are transmitted over the network and sniffed using
the sniffer. The comparison is made against the fingerprint set of TS corpus.
Notably, all the embedded files are successfully detected.
In a nutshell, if the underlying bit stream is not altered, then embedded files
can be easily detected using approximate matching based approach. Detection
of files in case of zipping them is out of the picture, as the raw byte structure is
altered.
4.6 Stream Analysis
Till now, single packet analysis (SPA) approach is used for detecting files. In
SPA, a file is declared to be detected if at least a single packet for a given file
is matched. But there is a shortcoming to this approach. Due to ‘common
subsequence’, many false positives are reported and thus causing a file to be
falsely detected. To circumvent this problem, stream analysis (STA) is proposed.
STA determines the presence of a file in network traffic by considering match
results from more than one packet of a connection stream. It is observed in
SPA that, if a single packet gives a false positive, then that packet will give
more than one false positive matches. The very low rate of FPoR supports this
observation. This observation is used in defining two important parameters for
STA. These parameters are defined below:
match_per_packet A threshold for the maximum number of matches a packet
can have. If the number of matches are higher than this, then the packet
is neglected. For instance, let match_per_packet = 2. Then, if a packet
returns a true positive and a false positive, the match count is 2 for the
packet and the packet is ignored.
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packets_per_file A threshold for the minimum number of packets containing
‘known file’ content, required to declare a file to be detected. For instance,
let packets_per_file=2. In network traffic, if 2 packets containing content
of file A are detected, then this file A is declared to be detected.
The process for testing STA is similar to SPA. The files are sent over the network
and the traffic is sniffed and analysed by the sniffer. In STA, a connection
table is defined for each network connection stream. A connection table’s row, is
a tuple of {Source IP, Destination IP, Source Port, Destination Port, Detection
Status}, where Detection Status is a table with each row is tuple of {File De-
tected, packet count}. Whenever a packet arrives, if the entry for the particular
connection stream is not in the table, a new entry is added, else the correspond-
ing entry in the table is updated. If the number of matches for a packet is more
than match_per_packet, that packet is ignored. For a given file, if the number
of matching packets = packets_per_file, the file is declared to be detected and
all the counters are cleared for that connection stream.
In the test scenario, threshold match score = 100 is taken, as the number of
matches with 100 are high (see Fig. 7.3). Also, a high confidence score reflects
the certainty of the files presence. While match_per_packet = 5 and pack-
ets_per_file = 2 are taken. Motivation for taking match_per_packet = 5 is,
in SPA it is observed that the minimum number of matches per packet is 1,
followed by 5. Value 1 is true for all packets and hence 5 is taken.
Value of packets_per_file parameter depends on many factors. If the ‘known
file’ database consists of many small sized files, then for a given file, the number
of network packets generated are less. For instance, a file of 3 KB will generate
only 2 packets of 1500 Bytes (ideally) size. If a database have similar files, then
a packet will generate more than one false positive for one packet, though it is
because of similar content rather than ‘common subsequence’. Packets having
high number of matches might be ignored and effectively reducing the number
of packets available to detect a file. For instance, a file with size 4.5 KB will
generate 3 packets of 1500 Bytes. If two packets match with more than one file,
then detecting such file is difficult.
In the test scenario, t = 100 is taken. Traffic is generated for randomly selected
383 files from the TS corpus, with minimum file size of 4.8 KB. In this test
scenario a true positive detection rate of 98.69% files is achieved.
STA has following advantages over SPA: Firstly, files can be detected with more
confidence as false file detection, because of ‘common subsequence’, is avoided
by using match_per_packet parameter. Secondly, as soon as a file is detected,
the connection stream can be dropped, inhibiting the further file transfer. But
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this approach might not be able to detect small files, where the minimum file
size depends on the parameter packets_per_file parameter.
All the testing for STA is done using oﬄine packets, therefore exact processing
time in live situation are is not available for this approach.
Chapter 5
Related Work
This chapter summarizes the related work for this thesis. Though not much
previous work for data leakage prevention over an organisation’s network is
available. Most of the systems used are commercial and closed source, therefore
information about their internal working, performance and detection rate are
not available. Most of the information acquired is through the whitepapers
published by McAfee and Securosis, which gives only an overview about the
state of the art.
The organisation of the chapter is as following: Sec. 8.1 gives an overview of
data leakage prevention systems and various content analysis technique used in
them. These systems specialise in preventing data leakage and most relevant to
the work proposed in this thesis.
Section 8.2 discusses how content matching is performed in intrusion detection
systems. Though, these systems does not specialise in known content detection,
but a simple string matching technique is used to detect malicious text/binary
constructs in a network packet payload. A brief overview of signature matching
is presented.
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5.1 Data Loss Prevention Systems
The present work concentrates on the content analysis, thus in the following
section a general overview of Data Loss Prevention Systems (DLPS) is given,
while the various content analysis technique used by them is discussed in detail.
For detailed information on DLPS, refer to [25]. Firstly, the three states of data
are defined and this knowledge is further used to define DLPS.
5.1.1 States of Data
According to [29], the data of an organisation can be classified into 3 main
states:
• Data In Motion (DIM) It comprises of data which is in the process of
being transmitted over the network. It includes emails, instant messages,
web traffic and so on.
• Data In Use (DIU) The data at a network endpoint, like desktop or
USB device, comes under this category.
• Data At Rest (DAR) Information in the storage comprises DAR. For
instance, data in FTP server or file systems.
The 3 states of data are also summarised in Fig. 8.1.
5.1.2 Definition
Data Loss Prevention Systems (DLPS) is a mechanism that identifies senstive
information by content in DIM, DAR, or DIU, and prevent leakage to outside
of an organisation [29].
DLPS helps organisations to comply with government regulations pertaining
to privacy, the protection of sensitive data, and the maintenance of records.
According to [25], key defining characteristics of DLPS are :
• Deep content analysis,
• Central policy management,
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Figure 5.1: The 3 states of dataa.
ahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_at_Rest (last accessed 2013-June-25).
• Broad content coverage across multiple platforms and locations.
By defining policies, a DLPS can automatically ensures that no sensitive data
is stored, sent or accessed by an unauthorized person. Unlike white and black-
listing, DLPS blocks the activities involving leakage of sensitive data.
5.1.3 Content Analysis Techniques
In this thesis, various content analysis techniques used by DLPS are analysed
and compared against the proposed approximate matching based approach. Ac-
cording to [25], there are following approaches used in DLPS for content analysis:
1. Rule-Based/Regular Expressions: This is the most common analysis
technique offered by various content discovery tools. In this technique, the
content is analysed for specific rules, e.g, 16 digits credit card numbers,
social security numbers etc.
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Best for: For detecting structured data like credit card numbers, health-
care codes/records. It is generally the first filter which is used while fil-
tering data.
Strengths: Regular expression rules can be processed quickly and also easy
to configure. It is a widely used technique, hence well understood and also
easy to incorporate into diverse products.
Weakness: False positive rate is high. Also, inability to identify unstruc-
tured data.
2. Database Fingerprinting: In this technique, database dump or live
data from database is used and only exact matches are reported. For
example, a policy which looks only for credit card number in the organi-
sation’s customer base, thus ignoring employees of the organisation while
buying online.
Best for: This technique is best used for detecting structured data from
databases.
Strengths: A very low false positive rate is offered, as only exact matches
are reported. This also enables protection of customer/sensitive data while
ignoring other similar data used by the employees of the organisation.
Weakness: Nightly dumps of the database won’t contain transaction data
since the last extract. On the other hand, live connection to the database
will negatively effect the performance.
3. Exact File Matching: In this technique, cryptographic hash functions
are used to generate fingerprint of the sensitive files. The content being
monitored is also hashed using the same hash function, if the fingerprints
match exactly, then the activity is reported.
Best for: This technique is best used for media files or binaries where
textual analysis is not feasible.
Strengths: It is agnostic to file type, and have negligible false positive rate.
Weakness: Evading such monitoring is trivial. Flipping a single byte in
the file will change the fingerprint of the file, thus making it worthless for
editable files like office documents and text files.
4. Partial Document Matching (PDM): This technique looks for a com-
plete or a partial match of sensitive content. Rolling hash technique is
often used and was discussed in Sec. 5.3.3. When outbound content is en-
countered, it is run through the same hash technique, and the hash values
are compared for matches.
Best for: This technique is useful for protecting unstructured content. For
example, CAD files and source code files.
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Strength: Effectively protect unstructured data, and have a low false posi-
tive rate. Doesn’t rely on complete matching of large documents; can find
policy violations on even a partial match.
Weakness: Common phrases in a protected document may trigger false
positives. Trivial to avoid (ROT1) encryption is sufficient. It is not most
efficient in detecting non-text files.
5. Statistical Analysis: Machine learning, Bayesian analysis and other sta-
tistical techniques are used to analyse the content and determine possible
policy violations.
Best for: Unstructured content where deterministic techniques, like partial
document matching, would be ineffective. For example, a repository of
engineering plans where partial document matching will be impractical
because of high volatility or massive volume.
Weakness: It is prone to false positives and false negatives. Also, requires
a large corpus of source content.
6. Conceptual/Lexicon: This technique uses a combination of dictionar-
ies, rules, and other analyses techniques to protect nebulous content that
resembles an "idea". For example, traffic resembling to insider trading,
sexual harassment, running a private business from a work account.
Best for: Completely unstructured ideas that cannot be categorized into
known documents, databases or other registered sources.
Strength: Can be used to detect content with loosely defined policy viola-
tions.
Weakness: In general, it is really hard to define such rule-set and requires
considerable time and effort to develop a rule-set. It is very prone to high
false positives.
7. Categories: Categories, also known as compliance templates, use combi-
nation of above described methods to detect certain types of content. For
example, 1 credit card number + 1 partial date + expiry date keywords.
If such a combination of information is find in the outbound data, the
message is flagged.
Best for: Any type of content which can be described as a category. Use-
ful in case of content related to privacy regulations, or industry-specific
guidelines.
Strengths: It is extremely simple to configure and also saves considerable
policy generation time.
Weakness: It is only good for easily categorized rules and content.
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The PDM technique is the most relevant of them all, and its comparison with
approximate matching based approach is discussed in next chapter.
5.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
An intrusion detection system (IDS) inspects all the inbound and outbound
network activity and identifies suspicious patterns that may indicate an attack
on the network as a whole or on a system in the network. IDS help informa-
tion systems prepare for, and deal with attacks. This is achieved by collecting
information from various systems and network sources, and then analysing the
information for possible security problems. In short, IDS acts like a ‘burglar
alarm’.
In this section, only the features which enable IDS to detect network packet
content are discussed. For detailed information of IDS please refer to [15].
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are IDS which perform analysis for
the passing traffic on the entire subnet. NIDS work in promiscuous mode, and
matches the traffic that is passed on the subnets to the library of known attacks.
Snort is one of the most popular NIDS. It is a cross-platform, lightweight IDS
tool that can be deployed to monitor small TCP/IP networks and detect a wide
variety of suspicious network traffic as well as outright attacks [39].
Whenever NIDS encounter a network packet, it performs a match against a
predefined signature set in order to determine whether the packet is malicious
or not. This step is called signature matching. Signature matching consists
of two distinct operations: packet classification, which involves examining the
values of a packet header fields, and deep packet inspection, in which the packet
payload is matched against a set of predefined patterns.
Signatures for snort are specified using simple rule-based language. Payload
detection rule options are the most relevant to content matching. Specifically,
content keyword is the most interesting of them all.
By using content keyword, snort checks the payload content. "Whenever content
options pattern match is performed, the Boyer-Moore pattern match function
is called and the test is performed against the packet content" [38]. Such a test
is successful only when the argument data string matches exactly with content
in the packet’s payload. snort can match both text and binary content.
Listing 8.1 shows a snort rule using content keyword. In this particular snort
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rule, content keyword argument is binary data and ensuring the detection of
PNG file’s ‘magic’ sequence.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET $FILE_DATA_PORTS -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"FILE-IDENTIFY PNG
file magic detection"; flow:to_client,established; file_data; content:"|89|
PNG|0D 0A 1A 0A|"; within:8; fast_pattern; flowbits:set,http.png; flowbits:
noalert; classtype:misc-activity; sid:20478; rev:1;)
Listing 5.1: Snort rule using content keyword.
Using content keyword for content detection is only good for matching small
text or binary data, for example detecting a malicious string construct in a
file transferred over the network. IDS does not specialize in preventing data
leakage from a database of files. Detecting large file content will make the rules
complicated and also severely slow down the processing speed.
5.3 Comparison
This section discusses how the approximate matching based approach compare
against the other existing approaches. A comparison is made against the rolling
hash approach and keyword based approach. The other methods, like using
cryptographic hash functions and regular expressions are either easy to evade
or not meant for detecting leakage of a document as a whole, therefore not
discussed in this section.
5.3.1 Rolling Hash
Partial Document Matching (PDM) technique discussed in Sec. 8.1.3, internally
uses rolling hash to compare documents and detect leakage. An introduction to
rolling hash is presented in Sec. 5.3.3. As mentioned earlier, most of the DLPS
are commercial and closed source and thus not considered for testing purposes.
MyDLP1 is an open source DLPS. To test detection rate of rolling hash, MyDLP
Community Edition is used.
MyDLP is installed on a server and this server is used as a network proxy. All
the traffic pases through this proxy and analysed by MyDLP for potential data
leakage. For testing purposes, MyDLP is installed on a Ubuntu Server running
in a Virtual Machine (VM). All the test traffic is diverted through this VM in
1http://www.mydlp.org (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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order to be analysed by MyDLP. Though, post installation, the tool did not
work smoothly and frequently broke down and required re-installation to make
it work again.
MyDLP’s PDM feature is only tested. Procedure to use PDM is described in
[32]. During the test it is observed that MyDLP can only detect files which
contain texts, like pdf, doc, txt, and not good for preventing leakage through
other binary formats like, exe, jpg, gif etc. Rigorous tests to establish detection
rate cannot be performed on MyDLP, as there were problems faced in running
the tool reliably.
Drawbacks of Rolling Hash
Rolling hash based approach suffers with certain drawbacks. These drawbacks
and how rolling hash compare against approximate matching based appraoch is
disccused below.
For a given file there will be large number of rolling hashes generated. The
number of hashes generated for a file depends on the size of the file and the
window size used to generate rolling hashes. Due to large number of hashes
generated for a given file, the number of lookups to perform a comparison is
also large and thus slowing down the comparison process. Also, rolling hashes
occupy large memory as one file have many hashes. Consequently, for a large
database of confidential files, it is possible that all the rolling hashes cannot
be loaded into RAM simultaneously and might effect the overall performance
negatively.
In case of xls and doc files, it is observed that they contain large sequences of 0
and 1, called 0 run and 1 run respectively. With rolling hash, such runs could
give large number of false positives. Hex dump of a xls having 0 and 1 run is
documented in appendix C.
On the other hand, in approximate matching based approach, only one finger-
print is generated for one file or packet. Thus, requiring significantly less number
of lookups to perform a comparison. Also, the length of a fingerprint of a file
is small and can be easily loaded into the RAM and perform quick matches.
Lastly, approximate matching algorithms detect unique features for a digital
object by determining the entropy of the content. Thus, 0 and 1 run in doc and
xls file would not cause false positive matches in this approach.
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5.3.2 Keyword Matching
In this approach, important words in a document are determined by using some
machine learning algorithms. These words from various files in the database are
put together to make one big dictionary. While analysing network packets, if
words from this dictionary occurs, then that connection is declared suspicious.
Drawbacks
Maintaining such a word dictionary is cumbersome. Adding and deleting a
file is not straightforward, as the corresponding words need to be added or
deleted from the dictionary. Also, a word in the dictionary could occur both in
confidential and junk file simultaneously and thus can have high false positive
rate. In case of approach proposed in this thesis, there is no dictionary required.
Only a list of fingerprints for the files to protected is maintained. The false
positive rate, as observed in the previous chapter is not so high.
To summarise, approximate matching approach is better than existing approaches
as it is file type agnostic and easy to maintain. One file will have only one fin-
gerprint and thus a file can be simply added or deleted by adding or deleting
its corresponding fingerprint from the database. Also, calculating a fingerprint
of a file is effortless.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
This chapter discusses some general issues about the proposed approach. Ini-
tially, a discussion about the detection rate of the approach is presented. In the
next section, classification of the approach based on level of packet analysis is
discussed.
Section 6.3 looks into the statistics of processing time using mrsh-v2 for packet
analysis. A difference between content and context analysis is given in section
6.4 and elucidates that the present approach performs content analysis.
Section 9.5 discusses how to block the traffic once ‘known file’ content is detected
in the network traffic. Whereas, Sec. 9.6 looks into the problem of how to
successfully deal with encrypted traffic and ensure that protected data is not
leaked.
Approximate matching based approach is an ingenuous way to deal with data
leakage. As highlighted in Chapter 8, that the existing approaches are mostly
commercial and closed source, and there exist not much prior work in detecting
‘known file’ in the network traffic robustly. The proposed approach is one of the
first comprehensive work to deal with problem of data leakage.
Many DLPS uses cryptographic and rolling hash functions to check for data
leakage. As mentioned previously, it is trivial to evade crypto hash based check-
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ing. Rolling hash holds some promise to acknowledge the problems with other
approaches, but it suffers with certain drawbacks as well. Though, only MyDLP
could be analysed for performance of rolling hash, which showed that not all
file types can be detected using rolling hash. For instance, doc and pdf are de-
tected but jpg and exe are not. Also, with rolling hash the number of look-ups
performed in order to detect a match are high.
6.1 Detection Rate
The eventual goal of a data leakage prevention system is to stop the transfer
of confidential information out of the network. In this work, transferring of
file as a whole is considered. To ensure the detection rate is high, comparison
is performed only for the application layer data and mrsh-v2 is preferred over
sdhash. Also, mrsh-v2 is modified to ensure that application layer header does
not influence the match score. During the testing with random data and real
world data using SPA, all the files are detected successfully. While in STA, the
detection rate of 98.69% is achieved. The low detection rate for STA is due
to the presence of small files in the database and thus not generating enough
packets to perform analyses. Since, none of the existing tools could be analysed
thoroughly, the detection rate of them is not available. Consequently, a relative
comparison of false detection rate cannot be made. Thus, the research goal 5 is
considered to be partially achieved.
6.2 Level of Packet Inspection
The proposed approach analyses the content of the network packet, to determine
whether ‘known file’ is being transmitted in the communication stream under
investigation. As per the classification of packet inspection technology discussed
in Sec. 5.5, present approach can be classified as deep packet inspection tech-
nique. The lower layer headers are used to get the source and destination IP
address and ports and this information is used to maintain a table of ‘known
files’ detected in the connection. While, lower layer headers - link, IP and TCP
layer, are completely stripped to perform content analysis.
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6.3 Processing Time
Major constituent of processing time in present approach is the time spent
in iterating over the list of fingerprints to compare a given network packet.
While analysing processing time for 61,700 network packets with mrsh-v2 using
gprof, it is found that 99.8% is spent comparing a network packet against the
list of fingerprints (3280), while only 0.2% of the time is spent in hashing a
network packet. If the number of fingerprints of ‘known files’ increases, then the
processing time will also increase.
If it is possible to index mrsh-v2 fingerprints, then the processing time can be
reduced in comparing fingerprints. An mrsh-v2 fingerprint is simply the Bloom
filters’ value, generated for the given file. At present there is no known way to
index this information. This could be part of the future work.
6.4 Content vs. Context
In order to understand the intricacy of content and context, example of a letter
and its envelope can be used. In such a case, the letter will be the content,
whereas the envelope and environment around it will constitute the context.
Context is inferred using the source, destination, size, recipients, sender, header
information, metadata, time, format etc. Contextual analysis is a highly useful
approach, like in detecting insider trading attempts.
While content analysis involves looking inside containers and analysing the con-
tent itself. Use of content analysis does not restrict the analysis to a certain
specified context. If a data is declared to be confidential, it should be protected
everywhere - not just in obviously sensitive container [25].
Content analysis is more difficult and time consuming than basic contextual
analysis. In this thesis, the approach proposed performs a bitwise content anal-
ysis to detect the ‘known data’ and the results observed are promising.
6.5 Filtering/Blocking Traffic
The sole aim of using any data leakage tool is to block the traffic which is
potentially leaking data. Most of the communication performed is synchronous
and in real time. Thus actively monitoring the data and blocking is of utmost
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importance. In this section, some of the probable approaches are discussed
which can be used to block traffic.
Bridge
A bridge is a device that connects two or more local area networks, or two
or more segments of the same network [45]. A bridge can be used to filter
network traffic. With a bridge, there is a system with two network cards which
performs content analysis in the middle. If there is some malicious content (as
per policy) being transferred, the bridge is capable to break the connection for
that session. Bridging can be used in the present scenario for blocking traffic
when known content is detected. But it suffers with a small drawback, i.e, it
might not stop all the bad traffic before it leaks out the content. By the time
content analyser gets enough traffic to make an intelligent decision, the good
part of the content might have already been transferred. Considering the above
shortcoming, it is not the best possible solution, but it holds the advantage that
such an arrangement is protocol agnostic [25].
TCP Poisoning
Another possible approach to block or filter traffic is to use TCP poisoning. In
TCP poisoning, TCP reset flag is used to terminate the connection. TCP reset
flag is mostly set to 0 and has no effect, but when this bit is set to 1, it indicates
the receiving endpoint should immediately halt using the TCP connection. The
further packet received for the corresponding port number are also discarded by
the end system. In a nutshell, TCP reset kills a TCP connection instantly [36].
The traffic is constantly monitored and as soon as data transfer against the
policy is detected, the connection is terminated by sending TCP reset. This
solution is simple to use, but have some disadvantages. Firstly, this works only
for protocols based on TCP. Secondly, it is inefficient in case of protocols which
keep trying to get the traffic through after a failed try. For instance, after TCP
poisoning a single email message, the email server will keep trying to send it for
3 days, as often as every 15 minutes (as per settings). Lastly, the same issue as
with bridging. By the time some nefarious activity is detected, some part of the
traffic has already passed through.
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Proxy
Each network packet can broadly be divided into address area and data area.
Where, data area contains information written by the application program that
created the packet and address area contains information to ensure that the
packet is delivered to the right system and right application in the system [45].
Proxy servers ( or application-level gateway) operate by examining incoming or
outgoing packets not only for their source or destination addresses but also for
information carried within the data area ( as opposed to the address area) of
each network packet. A proxy could be protocol/application specific and queues
up network traffic before passing it and in turn allowing for deeper analysis of
the traffic [25]. Since the traffic is being queued and analysed, it ensures that
no part of the data is leaked in case some information is being leaked out.
Such gateway proxies can also be used as a reverse SSL proxy to sniff encrypted
connections and discussed in detail in the next section.
6.6 Dealing with Encrypted Traffic
Many organisations in order to ensure a secure communication over the network
use encryption. HTTPS, SSH, SFTP etc are some widely used protocols which
support encryption. On an encrypted channel, the content is scrambled and the
underlying bit stream is altered. In such a situation, detecting and preventing
egress of ‘known file’ is difficult, unless the content is decrypted.
To circumvent this problem, man-in-the-middle (MITM) approach can be de-
ployed. A proxy server is used to intercept the communication, which acts as a
reverse proxy and launches a man-in-the-middle attack. Such an arrangement
is well documented in case of HTTPS [12]. In an organisation environment, net-
work administrator have enough authority to setup a reverse proxy server for
intercepting encrypted traffic and checking network traffic content for known
data.
In a desktop environment, MITM approach to intercept encrypted traffic can
be tested using OWASP WebScarab1. WebScarab is a framework for analysing
applications that communicate using HTTP and HTTPS protocol and supports
MITM for HTTPS.
1www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WebScarab (last accessed 2013-June-25).
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6.7 Hardware Implementation
Implementing the traditional cryptographic hash functions into hardware is a
common practice these days. Performing hashing in a dedicated hardware is
more efficient than doing to on a CPU. mrsh-v2 performs many low level op-
erations, like bit shifting, to generate fingerprint of a content. Also, there exist
hardwares which maintain network connection tables, e.g. routers. Thus, in the-
ory it is possible to implement the proposed arrangement at the hardware level.
This will significantly reduce the processing time. This could be an interesting
future work to test for.
6.8 Limitation
During the design, implementation and testing phase no major limitations have
been encountered for the proposed approach. Some minor limitations are enu-
merated below:
• Approximate matching based approach cannot detect a confidential file
zipped and then transferred over the network. As discussed earlier, if
the underlying bit stream is changed, approximate matching algorithms
cannot detect the content.
• Malicious insider can take snapshots of the confidential data and transfer
these snapshots. The present approach can not stop such data leakage
attempt.
• If the minimum file size in the ‘known file’ database is small, then the
file detection using stream based analysis might not always be reliable, as
discussed in Sec. 7.6.
• The surveillance can be evaded by sending out files by encoding them, like
using Base64 scheme. Since, the underlying original bitstream is altered
by doing so. If encoding is being performed by some application, then
such a situation can be dealt easily in an orgnisation’s environment. Ad-
ministrators can sniff the application specific traffic and check it against
the ‘known file’ fingerprint set created for encoded traffic, discussed in
Sec. 6.7.1.
Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work
The problem of data loss has become an important problem and a robust solu-
tion is need of the hour. Possible routes of data loss have become complicated
and numerous, making countermeasures difficult to develop and deploy. The in-
creased incidents of involvement of insiders in data leakage has raised a serious
question on confidentiality of organisation’s internal information, like intellec-
tual property. In this work, the problem of identifying files in network traffic is
considered. The problem with the existing technology is highlighted and need
of open source tools and techniques needed to solve this problem is emphasised.
In order to solve this problem, bitwise content analysis of data in motion using
approximate matching is proposed. Each packet is analysed for containing the
‘known file’. It is successfully established that it is possible to detect files using
this approach. To validate the technique and implementation, several scenarios
are considered and tested. In a first step, random data is used to explore feasi-
bility and establish a benchmark for what to expect from such a methodology.
The tests with real world data showed promising results as well. Both binary
and text based files can be easily detected using this approach. However, with
real world data, problem of ‘common substrings’ persists. Wherefore, a easy
extension is proposed of using stream based analysis.
In stream based analysis, a table is maintained for each connection stream.
After analysing the results of single packet based approach, certain parameters
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are determined in order to prevent false positives caused by ‘common substrings’.
In this approach, a connection table of tuple: {Source IP, Destination IP, Source
Port, Destination Port, Detection Status}, is maintained for each stream. After
detecting a certain pre-defined number of packets, a file is declared to be detected
in that stream. In such a case, the connection can be terminated immediately.
Compared to existing techniques, approach presented in this work is simple,
straight forward and application layer protocol agnostic. The detection rate
does not vary much for different file types and during testing all the files of
various file types were detected successfully. In theory, the present approach is
file type independent. Also, using such a tool is simple, as only the fingerprint
of the file to be protected is needed. Thus, adding or deleting a file from the
database is not cumbersome.
Future Work
In order to promote this approach further, there are several next steps. Some
of the possible future work is enumerated below:
• A detail analysis of performance in high bandwidth network is required.
Does in such situation, performance is comparable to existing methods?
To enhance the performance, implementing this solution in hardware could
be an alternative and was also discussed in previous chapter.
• What is the detection rate in case the database has similar files? How can
the stream based analysis parameters be determined so that the detection
of content is accurate.
• How accurate is this approach in detecting information leakage if partial
content of a file is being transmitted.
• Analysis of commercial DLPS products and how the proposed approach
fare against them.
• Can mrsh-v2 fingerprints be indexed and in turn reduce the processing
times?
• Finally, is it possible to tune approximate matching algorithms further, in
order to receive better results?
Appendix A
Common Subsequence
String
Hex dump of a packet containing ‘common subsequence’ and thus generates
more than one false positive.
0000000: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 5859 5a20 0000 ..........XYZ ..
0000020: 0000 0000 f351 0001 0000 0001 16cc 5859 .....Q........XY
0000030: 5a20 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Z ..............
0000040: 0000 5859 5a20 0000 0000 0000 6fa2 0000 ..XYZ ......o...
0000050: 38f5 0000 0390 5859 5a20 0000 0000 0000 8.....XYZ ......
0000060: 6299 0000 b785 0000 18da 5859 5a20 0000 b.........XYZ ..
0000070: 0000 0000 24a0 0000 0f84 0000 b6cf 6465 ....$.........de
0000080: 7363 0000 0000 0000 0016 4945 4320 6874 sc........IEC ht
0000090: 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e69 6563 2e63 6800 tp://www.iec.ch.
00000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1649 4543 2068 ...........IEC h
00000b0: 7474 703a 2f2f 7777 772e 6965 632e 6368 ttp://www.iec.ch
00000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6465 ..............de
00000f0: 7363 0000 0000 0000 002e 4945 4320 3631 sc........IEC 61
0000100: 3936 362d 322e 3120 4465 6661 756c 7420 966-2.1 Default
0000110: 5247 4220 636f 6c6f 7572 2073 7061 6365 RGB colour space
0000120: 202d 2073 5247 4200 0000 0000 0000 0000 - sRGB.........
0000130: 0000 2e49 4543 2036 3139 3636 2d32 2e31 ...IEC 61966-2.1
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0000140: 2044 6566 6175 6c74 2052 4742 2063 6f6c Default RGB col
0000150: 6f75 7220 7370 6163 6520 2d20 7352 4742 our space - sRGB
0000160: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000170: 0000 0000 0000 6465 7363 0000 0000 0000 ......desc......
0000180: 002c 5265 6665 7265 6e63 6520 5669 6577 .,Reference View
0000190: 696e 6720 436f 6e64 6974 696f 6e20 696e ing Condition in
00001a0: 2049 4543 3631 3936 362d 322e 3100 0000 IEC61966-2.1...
00001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 2c52 6566 6572 656e ........,Referen
00001c0: 6365 2056 6965 7769 6e67 2043 6f6e 6469 ce Viewing Condi
00001d0: 7469 6f6e 2069 6e20 4945 4336 3139 3636 tion in IEC61966
00001e0: 2d32 2e31 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 -2.1............
00001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 7669 ..............vi
0000200: 6577 0000 0000 0013 a4fe 0014 5f2e 0010 ew.........._...
0000210: cf14 0003 edcc 0004 130b 0003 5c9e 0000 ............\...
0000220: 0001 5859 5a20 0000 0000 004c 0956 0050 ..XYZ .....L.V.P
0000230: 0000 0057 1fe7 6d65 6173 0000 0000 0000 ...W..meas......
0000240: 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000250: 0000 0000 028f 0000 0002 7369 6720 0000 ..........sig ..
0000260: 0000 4352 5420 6375 7276 0000 0000 0000 ..CRT curv......
0000270: 0400 0000 0005 000a 000f 0014 0019 001e ................
0000280: 0023 0028 002d 0032 0037 003b 0040 0045 .#.(.-.2.7.;.@.E
0000290: 004a 004f 0054 0059 005e 0063 0068 006d .J.O.T.Y.^.c.h.m
00002a0: 0072 0077 007c 0081 0086 008b 0090 0095 .r.w.|..........
00002b0: 009a 009f 00a4 00a9 00ae 00b2 00b7 00bc ................
00002c0: 00c1 00c6 00cb 00d0 00d5 00db 00e0 00e5 ................
00002d0: 00eb 00f0 00f6 00fb 0101 0107 010d 0113 ................
00002e0: 0119 011f 0125 012b 0132 0138 013e 0145 .....%.+.2.8.>.E
00002f0: 014c 0152 0159 0160 0167 016e 0175 017c .L.R.Y.‘.g.n.u.|
0000300: 0183 018b 0192 019a 01a1 01a9 01b1 01b9 ................
0000310: 01c1 01c9 01d1 01d9 01e1 01e9 01f2 01fa ................
0000320: 0203 020c 0214 021d 0226 022f 0238 0241 .........&./.8.A
0000330: 024b 0254 025d 0267 0271 027a 0284 028e .K.T.].g.q.z....
0000340: 0298 02a2 02ac 02b6 02c1 02cb 02d5 02e0 ................
0000350: 02eb 02f5 0300 030b 0316 0321 032d 0338 ...........!.-.8
0000360: 0343 034f 035a 0366 0372 037e 038a 0396 .C.O.Z.f.r.~....
0000370: 03a2 03ae 03ba 03c7 03d3 03e0 03ec 03f9 ................
0000380: 0406 0413 0420 042d 043b 0448 0455 0463 ..... .-.;.H.U.c
0000390: 0471 047e 048c 049a 04a8 04b6 04c4 04d3 .q.~............
00003a0: 04e1 04f0 04fe 050d 051c 052b 053a 0549 ...........+.:.I
00003b0: 0558 0567 0577 0586 0596 05a6 05b5 05c5 .X.g.w..........
00003c0: 05d5 05e5 05f6 0606 0616 0627 0637 0648 ...........’.7.H
00003d0: 0659 066a 067b 068c 069d 06af 06c0 06d1 .Y.j.{..........
00003e0: 06e3 06f5 0707 0719 072b 073d 074f 0761 .........+.=.O.a
00003f0: 0774 0786 0799 07ac 07bf 07d2 07e5 07f8 .t..............
0000400: 080b 081f 0832 0846 085a 086e 0882 0896 .....2.F.Z.n....
0000410: 08aa 08be 08d2 08e7 08fb 0910 0925 093a .............%.:
0000420: 094f 0964 0979 098f 09a4 09ba 09cf 09e5 .O.d.y..........
0000430: 09fb 0a11 0a27 0a3d 0a54 0a6a 0a81 0a98 .....’.=.T.j....
0000440: 0aae 0ac5 0adc 0af3 0b0b 0b22 0b39 0b51 ...........".9.Q
0000450: 0b69 0b80 0b98 0bb0 0bc8 0be1 0bf9 0c12 .i..............
0000460: 0c2a 0c43 0c5c 0c75 0c8e 0ca7 0cc0 0cd9 .*.C.\.u........
0000470: 0cf3 0d0d 0d26 0d40 0d5a 0d74 0d8e 0da9 .....&.@.Z.t....
73
0000480: 0dc3 0dde 0df8 0e13 0e2e 0e49 0e64 0e7f ...........I.d..
0000490: 0e9b 0eb6 0ed2 0eee 0f09 0f25 0f41 0f5e ...........%.A.^
00004a0: 0f7a 0f96 0fb3 0fcf 0fec 1009 1026 1043 .z...........&.C
00004b0: 1061 107e 109b 10b9 10d7 10f5 1113 1131 .a.~...........1
00004c0: 114f 116d 118c 11aa 11c9 11e8 1207 1226 .O.m...........&
00004d0: 1245 1264 1284 12a3 12c3 12e3 1303 1323 .E.d...........#
00004e0: 1343 1363 1383 13a4 13c5 13e5 1406 1427 .C.c...........’
00004f0: 1449 146a 148b 14ad 14ce 14f0 1512 1534 .I.j...........4
0000500: 1556 1578 159b 15bd 15e0 1603 1626 1649 .V.x.........&.I
0000510: 166c 168f 16b2 16d6 16fa 171d 1741 1765 .l...........A.e
0000520: 1789 17ae 17d2 17f7 181b 1840 1865 188a ...........@.e..
0000530: 18af 18d5 18fa 1920 1945 196b 1991 19b7 ....... .E.k....
0000540: 19dd 1a04 1a2a 1a51 1a77 1a9e 1ac5 1aec .....*.Q.w......
0000550: 1b14 1b3b 1b63 1b8a 1bb2 1bda 1c02 1c2a ...;.c.........*
0000560: 1c52 1c7b 1ca3 1ccc 1cf5 1d1e 1d47 1d70 .R.{.........G.p
0000570: 1d99 1dc3 1dec 1e16 1e40 1e6a 1e94 1ebe .........@.j....
0000580: 1ee9 1f13 1f3e 1f69 1f94 1fbf 1fea 2015 .....>.i...... .
0000590: 2041 206c 2098 20c4 20f0 211c 2148 2175 A l . . .!.!H!u
00005a0: 21a1 21ce 21fb 2227 !.!.!."’
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Appendix B
Score Distribution for File
Types Using mrsh-v2
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Figure B.1: Score distribution for doc file types using mrsh-v2.
76 Score Distribution for File Types Using mrsh-v2
 
Match Score
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f P
a
ck
e
ts
25 40 55 70 85 100
0
15
30
45
60
75
90 True Positive
False Positive
Figure B.2: Score distribution for exe file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.3: Score distribution for pdf file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.4: Score distribution for gif file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.5: Score distribution for xls file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.6: Score distribution for ppt file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.7: Score distribution for text file types using mrsh-v2.
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Figure B.8: Score distribution for jpg file types using mrsh-v2.
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Appendix C
Hex Dump of a xls File
Hex dump of 003444.xls file from TS corpus showing 0 and 1 run.
0000050: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000060: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000070: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000080: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000090: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000a0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000b0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000c0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000d0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000e0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00000f0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000100: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000110: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0000120: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0001650: 2200 2000 c0ff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ". .............
0001660: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0001670: ffff ffff 0a00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001680: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001690: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00016a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00016b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00016c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
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00016d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00016e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00016f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001700: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001710: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001720: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001730: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001740: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001750: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001760: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001770: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001780: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001790: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00017f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001800: feff 0000 0400 0200 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001810: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 e085 9ff2 ................
0001820: f94f 6810 ab91 0800 2b27 b3d9 3000 0000 .Oh.....+’..0...
0001830: c400 0000 0800 0000 0100 0000 4800 0000 ............H...
0001840: 0400 0000 5000 0000 0800 0000 6800 0000 ....P.......h...
0001850: 1200 0000 8000 0000 0b00 0000 9800 0000 ................
0001860: 0c00 0000 a400 0000 0d00 0000 b000 0000 ................
0001870: 1300 0000 bc00 0000 0200 0000 e404 0000 ................
0001880: 1e00 0000 1000 0000 4c4f 434b 4845 4544 ........LOCKHEED
0001890: 204d 4152 5449 4e00 1e00 0000 1000 0000 MARTIN.........
00018a0: 4c6f 636b 6865 6564 204d 6172 7469 6e00 Lockheed Martin.
00018b0: 1e00 0000 1000 0000 4d69 6372 6f73 6f66 ........Microsof
00018c0: 7420 4578 6365 6c00 4000 0000 00eb ee3c t Excel.@......<
00018d0: f113 bf01 4000 0000 808c 2019 3f6a be01 ....@..... .?j..
00018e0: 4000 0000 00d6 fd65 fd6e c101 0300 0000 @......e.n......
00018f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0001900: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00037f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0003800: 0100 0000 0200 0000 0300 0000 0400 0000 ................
0003810: 0500 0000 0600 0000 0700 0000 0800 0000 ................
0003820: 0900 0000 0a00 0000 feff ffff 0c00 0000 ................
0003830: 0d00 0000 0e00 0000 0f00 0000 1000 0000 ................
0003840: 1100 0000 1200 0000 feff ffff 1400 0000 ................
0003850: 1500 0000 1600 0000 1700 0000 1800 0000 ................
0003860: 1900 0000 1a00 0000 feff ffff fdff ffff ................
0003870: feff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003880: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003890: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00038a0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00038b0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00038c0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00038d0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
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00038e0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00038f0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003900: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003910: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003920: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003930: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003940: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003950: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003960: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003970: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003980: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003990: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039a0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039b0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039c0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039d0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039e0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
00039f0: ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ffff ................
0003a00: 5200 6f00 6f00 7400 2000 4500 6e00 7400 R.o.o.t. .E.n.t.
0003a10: 7200 7900 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 r.y.............
0003a20: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0003a30: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0003a40: 1600 0501 ffff ffff ffff ffff 0200 0000 ................
0003a50: 1008 0200 0000 0000 c000 0000 0000 0046 ...............F
0003a60: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 8074 afae .............t..
0003a70: fd6e c101 feff ffff 0000 0000 0000 0000 .n..............
0003a80: 4200 6f00 6f00 6b00 0000 0000 0000 0000 B.o.o.k.........
0003a90: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0003aa0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0003ab0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
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